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22 September 1982

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1708

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ARMED FORCES

FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY PROCURATOR DESCRIBED

Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA ZAKONNOST' in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 26 Mar 82) pp 17-19

[Article by Col Gen Justice A. Gornyy, chief military procurator: "Guarding Laws in the Armed Forces"]

[Text] One of the most important principles of Soviet state organizational development--the principle of socialist legality--also is fundamental in the area of military organizational development.

"The organizational development of our Army only could lead to successful results because it was created in the spirit of overall Soviet organizational development..." stated V. I. Lenin ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], XL, 76-77).

With the creation of the procurator's office in the country, its supervisory powers also extended to the Armed Forces, in which they were exercised by military procurators' offices established under the military and military-transportation revolutionary tribunals.

The first military procurators' offices were activated and began performing their functions as early as August-September on the basis of the 1922 Statute on the Procurator's Supervision. In November 1922 the People's Commissariat of Justice assumed the leadership of the procurator's office and the republic Revvoyensovet [Revolutionary Military Council] issued the "Instructions to Military Procurators and Their Assistants," which defined the missions of military procurators' offices and concrete powers of military procurators.

As experience was gained a decree of the TsIK [Central Executive Committee] and SNK [Council of People's Commissars] in 1926 approved the "Statute on Military Tribunals and the Military Procurator's Office." This is the first legislative act which defined in detail the missions, organization and operating procedures of the military procurator's office and powers of military procurators on the basis of general legislation about the procurator's supervision.

After establishment of the USSR Procurator's Office in 1933 the Main Military Procurator's Office was formed in its central apparatus with the rights of an administration. In 1937, after the formation of the People's Commissariat of the USSR Navy, the Main Navy Procurator's Office was set up as part of the central apparatus of the USSR Procurator's Office.

During the Great Patriotic War the transportation procurators' offices were converted into military procurators' offices and a portion of the rayon and oblast procurators' offices in the zone near the front was militarized. When the Great Patriotic War ended the need for militarized territorial and military transportation procurators' offices disappeared and they again were reorganized.

In connection with a concentration of leadership of the Army, Air Force and Navy in the People's Commissariat of the USSR Armed Forces (at the present time the USSR Ministry of Defense), the central entities of the military procurator's office were reorganized: The Main Military Procurator's Office of the USSR Armed Forces was formed as part of the USSR Procurator's Office.

The qualitative changes which occurred in the life of our state and Armed Forces were reflected in the "Statute on the Procurator's Supervision in the USSR" (1955) and the "Statute on the Military Procurator's Office" (1966), which became important milestones in the history of entities of the military procurator's office.

The further development of Soviet society and transformations carried out in the Armed Forces demanded an improvement in effectiveness of the work of the military procurator's office. On the basis of the Law on the USSR Procurator's Office the 4 August 1981 ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium approved the "Statute on the Military Procurator's Office," which stems from Leninist principles of the organization and work of the Soviet procurator's office, the USSR Constitution and the Law on the USSR Procurator's Office. It generalizes almost 60 years of working experience of the military procurator's office, regulates specific missions, and reflects features of its organization contingent on the nature of military organizational development.

One-man command is the most important principle of organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces and of military command and control. The commander directs all aspects of the life of a unit or combined unit. He plays the leading role in supporting legality, discipline and order. In accomplishing this mission, commanders rely on political entities, the party and Komsomol organizations, and the Army and Navy public. Only by taking account of this feature of importance for the Armed Forces can the military procurators effectively perform their functions. Functioning independently of local and military entities, the military procurator's office performs its function of reinforcing socialist legality in the Armed Forces in close coordination with the command element, political entities, and the Army and Navy public.

Another feature of the military procurator's office is its organizational alignment in conformity with the Armed Forces structure. In all development stages of the military procurator's office legislation has envisaged this

very organization for it, thus bringing the procurator's supervision closer to the troops, creating conditions for the close coordination of military procurators with the command element and political entities, and ensuring effectiveness of higher supervision over precise implementation of laws.

The procurators' detailed knowledge of the life, routine and work of the troops, and procurators' special and military training and professional expertise is an important condition for the effectiveness of procurator's supervision in the Armed Forces.

The organizational and legal forms of work, the structure, and the scope of tasks of the military procurator's office have changed over 60 years, but one thing has not changed: With all its work it contributes to reinforcement of socialist legality and military discipline in the Armed Forces and assists in comprehensively supporting national defense and increasing the Army and Navy's combat might. It was to attain these goals that the efforts of military procurator's offices were directed in the first years after their creation. Workers in the military procurator's office also gained certain combat experience by participating with the troops in combat operations at Lake Khasan and in the vicinity of the Khalkin-Gol River, in the liberation of the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia, and in the war against the White Finns. The experience gained was used in the Great Patriotic War.

Concentration of absolute state power in the hands of the State Defense Committee (GKO), the general mandatory nature of its decisions and instructions, and the expansion in competency of military authorities in areas declared under martial law considerably increased the range of issues to be resolved by military procurators' offices. Among the primary tasks was a resolute struggle against infractions of military discipline, infringements on the Army and Navy's combat might, enemy agents and other hostile elements, scaremongers, cowards, deserters, plunderers of military property, disorganizers of the rear and, in areas under martial law in addition, the struggle against crimes against defense, public order and state security.

Daily supervision was exercised over the strictest observance of wartime laws, GKO and USSR SNK decrees, and orders of the military high command. A struggle was waged against late or poor quality supply of troops with weapons, clothing and rations, the reasons and conditions contributing to the commission of infractions of legality were established, and steps were taken to remedy them. Protection of the rights and legal interests of servicemen and members of their families remained in the field of view.

When territory temporarily occupied by the enemy was liberated military procurators together with the officials of state security agencies would investigate the crimes of the Nazis and their accomplices on our soil and would search for war criminals.

In contact with territorial procurators, military procurators resolved the most diverse issues: They were concerned with maximum satisfaction of the front's needs and struggled against disorganizers of the rear, violators of public order, and violators of labor discipline at defense installations. It

was exceptionally important not to lose sight of the families of the Motherland's defenders and war invalids.

In their work the military procurators' offices assisted Army and Navy personnel to win victory at the fronts over the moral enemy of the socialist homeland.

The Motherland had high esteem for the work of officers of military procurators' offices during the Great Patriotic War. Some 2,000 procurators and investigators were decorated with orders and medals for conscientious performance of official duty and for combat exploits.

Lt Gen Justice N. Afanas'yev, major generals justice P. Ankudinov, B. Alekseyev, V. Izrail'yan, S. Petrovskiy, S. Smirnov, A. Semchenko, B. Shaver, L. Yachenin and others made a considerable contribution to organizing the cohesive, highly effective work of military procurators' offices in the war years.

The military procurators' offices were staffed with politically mature, qualified workers. The majority of them were party members, including those with a long period of party service, and Civil War participants. Performing their professional duties conscientiously, workers of the military procurators' offices often proved to be in a difficult front situation and personally participated in combat actions, and they at times assumed command of subunits and units.

Division military prosecutor A. Frangulov repeatedly took over subunits where the commanders had died in battle, led them into the attack and engaged in hand-to-hand fighting with the fascists while at forward positions of the defenders of "Malaya Zemlya" [the Novorossiysk Base of Operations] and "The Flaming Soil." While at the CP of a regiment fighting in encirclement, military investigator G. Prokhorov organized and led a group of servicemen into the attack and died the death of the brave. Under enemy fire military prosecutor's office secretary A. Pechnikova carried more than 20 wounded fighting men and commanders from the battlefield and gave them first aid.

New tasks arose for the military procurator's office in the postwar years, dictated by the further development of Soviet society, by the Communist Party's measures for reinforcing legality in the country, by fundamental transformations in the Armed Forces and by the development of Soviet military law. The task was to study vigorously and generalize the work experience of procurators' offices gained in the Great Patriotic War and adopt it intelligently, with the inclusion of proper corrections.

Successes in restoring the national economy and developing the economic system supported the further strengthening of national defense. A number of important measures were conducted for the technical reoutfitting and improvement in organizational structure of the Armed Forces, for improving the training of troop personnel, reorganizing party-political work, and developing Soviet military science. The USSR Armed Forces changed qualitatively and their combat might and readiness rose immeasurably. The sense of responsibility of Army and Navy personnel for accomplishment of the missions facing them

increased. Our country's Basic Law established that "the duty of the USSR Armed Forces to the people is to defend the socialist homeland reliably and be in constant combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor" (Article 31 of the USSR Constitution).

The work of the military procurator's office in the postwar period and in the present stage was arranged and is being arranged based on party demands for reinforcing socialist legality and with consideration of concrete conditions for the development of the Soviet Armed Forces.

In accomplishing measures for reinforcing legality, military discipline and law and order among the troops, military procurators and the investigators of military procurators' offices contributed to the successful accomplishment of transformations in the USSR Armed Forces and to an increase in the Army and Navy's combat might and combat readiness. New cadres developed and grew stronger and their work was recognized by the Motherland. Many officers of military procurators' offices were presented with governmental awards and given the title of Honored Lawyer.

Imperialism's course set for undermining detente and accelerating the arms race requires a further improvement in troop combat schooling and constant combat readiness. Under these conditions there is a significant increase in the role of legality, law and order and firm military discipline of Army and Navy personnel.

In all its work the military procurator's office is called upon to contribute to the indoctrination of all persons holding appointments in the Armed Forces, all servicemen, and reservists called up for courses in a spirit of precise and steadfast implementation of the USSR Constitution, Soviet laws, the military oath and military regulations, and observance of the rules of socialist society.

The basic ways for accomplishing these responsible tasks were defined by the 26th party congress and CPSU CC decrees on matters of ideological work and reinforcement of the struggle against infractions of the law.

Military procurators and investigators perform their work of fighting infractions of the law along two directions: calling to account persons who commit offenses, and performing extensive preventive work. Here they not only use everything positive from the experience of organizing work in previous years including the Great Patriotic War period, but also arrange work skillfully with consideration of new and more responsible tasks.

Active Patriotic War participants make a great contribution to accomplishing these tasks and arranging the work of procurators' offices: Lt Gen Justice V. Novikov, Maj Gen Justice V. Dmitrenko and Maj Gen Justice V. Ivakhnyuk. Major generals justice P. Anopko, V. Krotencov, I. Lebed', N. Novikov, B. Popov, N. Sotnikov, I. Yangayev and S. Malyugin, colonels justice A. Polonskiy, A. Perepelitsa and others have developed into prominent leaders who skillfully direct the work of district level procurators' offices.

Many officers in the apparatus of the Main Military Procurator's Office and the military procurators and investigators of military procurators' offices are genuine masters of their work.

Military procurators' offices attach great importance to the legal indoctrination of servicemen. The development of high moral-political qualities is achieved by the entire system of military training and of organizational and indoctrinational measures, among which of great importance is legal propaganda and influencing the soldiers' awareness by practical implementation of demands of the USSR Constitution, Soviet laws and military regulations.

A clear-cut system of legal indoctrination now has formed in the Armed Forces which encompasses all categories of service personnel. The most favorable conditions have been created for indoctrinating Army youth as active fighters for communism.

Entities of the military procurators' office in all stages of their development have performed the responsible tasks assigned to them for strengthening socialist legality, law and order and discipline in the Armed Forces conscientiously and productively thanks to the daily attention of the CPSU CC to the work of entities of the procurator's office, including the military procurator's office, thanks to the organizational and methodological direction on the part of the USSR Procurator General and assistance by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

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LOGISTICAL SERVICES AND SPECIAL TROOPS

PROBLEMS OF CONSTRUCTION AND COMBAT ENGINEERS DISCUSSED

Conference on Construction Safety Reported

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Mar 82 p 2

[Article by Engr-Col B. Lyapkalo and Engr-Col L. Nechayuk: "Work Safety at Construction Jobs; Notes from a Seminar"]

[Text] More than 11 million people are working in capital construction--the biggest branch of the country's national economy. Among them is a large detachment of military builders and workers and employees of the Soviet Armed Forces. How can their work be eased, be made more productive, and at the same time be made as safe as possible?

A seminar of supervisors of construction and billeting organs of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, which took place recently in Kiev, was devoted to this very problem.

Today we are publishing the notes of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents from this seminar.

The subject of the seminar, as well as of the main report given by the Deputy Chief of Construction and Billeting of Troops, Engineer-Lieutenant General M. Klimov, was formulated as follows: "Labor Safety Procedures--the Most Important Factor in Raising Labor Productivity in Construction."

For a person who is not too experienced in these questions, such a statement may appear strange, even paradoxical. However, there is no contradiction here. For, as was stressed in the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, integrated mechanization at construction jobs and comprehensive industrialization of construction are not only the main path to increase the productivity of labor, but also the decisive means to transform construction production into one which is convenient and safe for man. "From industrial safety measures--to safe equipment." This is how Comrade L. I. Brezhnev graphically expressed the essence of the task put forth by the party.

Such is the outlook. Well, how does what surrounds us now, today, appear?

The collection of machinery which the builders have is broad and varied. They perform the heaviest work with them: they prepare foundations, erect buildings, and install

equipment. The machine operator is now the chief figure at the construction jobs. Unquestionably, the reduction in the share of manual operations and equipping with highly productive machinery and mechanisms and motor transport have an ever greater influence on the improvement in working conditions for the builders and contribute to their alleviation and the creation of an environment which excludes job-related illness and production accidents. But this does not occur automatically or spontaneously. Constant concern on the part of the command and party and social organizations and consistent, purposeful work are needed here.

In the organizations and at enterprises and construction jobs of the Ministry of Defense, just as everywhere in the country, it is conducted on the basis of the corresponding five-year and integrated plans. For example, in the current five-year plan, as the speaker noted, it is envisaged that considerable funds will be expended on improving the working conditions and public health and domestic support for the personnel, which will permit freeing many thousands of people from heavy physical work. The plan also envisages the conduct of reconstruction and the repair of dozens and hundreds of production sectors and shops. By 1985, it is planned to construct 65 public health centers, 5 sanatoria-dispensaries, 6 boarding houses, and 50 other rest institutions.

Results of the first year of the present five-year plan showed that the plan for improving working conditions and labor safety practices is basically being well accomplished. Training methods work is being improved, the network of offices for labor safety procedures has been expanded, a training methods center with a permanent exhibition has been organized, and courses to raise the qualifications of specialists of the labor safety procedures service are operating. A series of training films on labor safety procedures on the construction of facilities has been released. In short, much is being done. At the same time, it cannot be stated that all is well with working conditions at military construction jobs and enterprises.

The reports and presentations of the seminar's participants presented facts which tell us that at times the command, political organs, and party and trade union organizations miss serious shortcomings in this work, at times treat it as a secondary matter, and put up with instances of violations of the obligations contained in collective agreements.

For this reason, the level of production accidents and labor losses at the construction sites and enterprises of the Leningrad, Baltic, Central Asian, Far East, Moscow, and Siberian Military Districts, the Northern and Black Sea Fleets, and several other centrally subordinated organizations is being lowered to a great extent more slowly than could have been expected.

It is well known that in order to cure a disease successfully, it is first necessary to provide the correct diagnosis. And the analysis of statistics led to the following conclusion. Almost a third of the violations of labor safety requirements are due to the unsatisfactory organization of work and poor maintenance of the work sites and the territory adjacent to the facilities. As much again is explained by an irresponsible attitude toward the rules for the operation of the machinery and road traffic. Shortcomings in teaching safe working procedures and the disregard of individual safety equipment bring one fourth of all the accidents and emergencies at enterprises and construction sites. And this always occurs through someone's fault.

In seven cases out of ten, the organizers of production and technical engineering personnel proved to be at fault: their oversight and carelessness, their incompetence and lack of knowledge.

Figures are extremely alarming. They show impartially that many organizers of production have poor knowledge of the rules and standards of working safety, and the training and instruction of the personnel are frequently conducted in a formal manner. An intolerable situation. For we are discussing the health, and sometimes even the life, of people. "And here," the First Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate of the Military Construction Units, Colonel M. Simakov, stressed in his presentation, "responsibility should be the highest possible. It is our primary duty--service, party, and human. No highest production indices can serve as a justification if they are attained by neglecting the health of people."

It is clear that skillfully organized propaganda of methods for the safe conduct of construction-assembly work directly assists the growth in the productivity of labor of the builders, its quality and style. Offices for labor safety procedures, intelligible graphical agitation, public reviews, the institute of unofficial inspectors--these are the forms of mass agitation work which are most effective and proven by life in this field. They are also used successfully in the leading collectives. But then, in some places they assume that they can disregard experience of this type. Up to now, for example, there are no offices for labor safety procedures in the construction directorates of the Turkestan and Far East Military Districts, and the Pacific Fleet and in the construction organizations where the chief engineers are S. Migulya, V. Zhutkin, B. Pruttsev, Yu. Fedulov, and R. Istomin. Should we be surprised that the matter of production accidents is least satisfactory there?

The military builders and workers of the Soviet Army themselves should participate in improving working conditions and in the strict observance of labor safety techniques. It would appear that this is an obvious thought. However, it has not yet become a guide to action everywhere. The secretary of the Central Committee of the trade union of workers of construction and the construction materials industry, L. Grunichev, spoke of this at the seminar. In particular, he noted: "Now being expanded everywhere in the country is support of the initiative of the brigade of Hero of Socialist Labor, A. Basov, whose meaning is to work in a highly productive manner, without injuries and accidents. About 6,000 brigades have already seized upon this initiative. But then, there is some lagging in this matter at the enterprises and construction sites of the Ministry of Defense."

Let us say directly that reproach is valid. The effectiveness of the work of public and unofficial work safety inspectors is also clearly insufficient. And you see, this is a great force. The command, political organs, and party and trade union organizations should devote more attention to instruction, raising the authority, and rewarding those who are concerned for the work safety of builders on the voluntary service principle.

During the two days, the participants in the seminar exchanged opinions and experience on the broadest range of questions on one general problem--how, in light of the requirements of the 26th Party Congress, to organize safe working conditions and healthy living conditions in the best manner for the military builders and workers. This task can be accomplished successfully only under the condition of constant, daily concern for people and for seeing that the expansion and improvement of production are combined without fail with effective labor safety procedures.

Mountain Fuel Line Exercise

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Apr 82 p 1

[Article by Capt A. Dzhunusov, Transcaucasus Military District: "Pipeline in the Mountains"]

[Text] The subordinates of Captain Yu. Bilibin, the acting commander of a pipeline battalion, were to lay many kilometers of pipeline on the last exercise. These kilometers were difficult: the thread of the pipeline was to cross canyons and gullies, drop to the bottom of a deep mountain ravine, and duplicate its steep breaks. But the men of the subunit coped successfully with the assigned mission.

The mechanized assembly teams headed by Senior Lieutenant A. Trushnin and Junior Sergeant A. Yefremov displayed high skill in laying the pipeline. Working with a reduced complement, the teams greatly exceeded the established standards.

The battalion laid the thread of the pipeline by the designated time. The troops received fuel in good time.

Test Exercises for Pipeline Layers

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Apr 82 p 1

[Article by Lt Col M. Lishniy, Kiev Military District: "Pipeline Layers"]

[Text] The company commanded by Senior Lieutenant S. Shmegal'skiy faced a difficult mission. In the course of the concluding lesson in special training it was to lay a pipeline in a short time over the route indicated by the senior commander and supply fuel to the attacking subunits.

The pipeline layers operated energetically. They lay the first dozens of meters of pipe, considerably exceeding the standard for an excellent grade. But it began to rain, the pipes began to slide, the heavily loaded pipe carriers moved forward with difficulty, and the rate of the work slowed down somewhat. However, even now it was sufficiently high to lay the fuel artery in time. Everything depended on whether the pipelayers would be able to maintain this rate to the end. For laying a pipeline is not only the accomplishment of difficult operations which require high skill and precision, but also a great physical load.

However, the work succeeded. Senior Lieutenant Shmegal'skiy is a young but sufficiently experienced commander. He directed his subordinates skillfully and issued the necessary instructions in good time and clearly.

Here on the route some disparity in the rates of performance of the operations was noted. The group of pipelayers move out ahead and the squad of assemblers who were performing the mating lagged behind somewhat. The company commander immediately transferred several specialists from one sector to another and the rates of advance of the layers and assemblers evened out.

"In the company every soldier and sergeant masters two or three specialties, and complete interchangeability has been achieved," the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel A. Volkov, commented on this fact. "It opens up greater possibilities for maneuvering forces and equipment in the accomplishment of operations."

This company has retained the title of excellent for several years in a row, and here all training-combat missions and standards, as a rule, are accomplished with exceeding the standards by 8-10 percent.

And really, the battalion as a whole is a leading subunit. In the last training year it became the winner in the competition among kindred subunits and was awarded the challenge prize of the district's military council. Now the battalion is also going in the vanguard of the competitors for a worthy greeting for the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR.

The chief of staff, Major M. Kuzhin, is making a large contribution to the battalion's successes. He recently arrived from another district where he went through a good school of bravery and skill, laying pipelines under mountain conditions. The soldierly labor of the officer-communist was marked with the Order of the Red Star. It is completely clear that the experience which he has acquired is also playing an important role here.

The steel ribbon of the pipeline, sparkling beneath the rain, lay far across the training ground from the caponier where the pump-compressor platoon had already deployed the pumping station. The next operation was pressurizing in the course of which the pipeline is tested using an air-compressor station for air-tightness under great pressure. Then all mechanical foreign matter was removed from it. These operations are accomplished quickly and clearly by the technical platoon under the command of Warrant Officer [praporshchik] A. Kucherenko.

When the pipelayers had finished their work, sweat was pouring on their faces. But the mood of the men was excellent because each one felt that the examination in special training had been successfully passed.

This was also evidenced by the stopwatch in the hands of the checker.

Combat Engineers Defuse Mines

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Apr 82 p 1

[Article by Sr Lt L. Gusakov, Kiev Military District: "Mines on the Bridge"]

[Text] The monotonous running of a clock mechanism was heard through the metal case which had been rusted through. The mine fuze had been actuated. How long until the explosion? A minute? Ten? And hour?... Even the combat engineer Captain Gavrilenko could not answer this now. The explosion could occur at any second.

...The news that during repair work on a railroad bridge the workers had discovered a mine quickly spread throughout the small Kulinovka Station which was lost among the steppes on the boundary of Khar'kovskaya and Belgorodskaya oblasts. The old-timers recalled that in the war during the Kursk Battle fierce actions had taken

place here. Evidently, the mine had been left to lay beneath the bridge since those terrible times.

The repairmen contacted the management of the Southern Railroad, whence they called the headquarters of the Kiev Military District. Work on the bridge was stopped immediately. The movement of the trains was stopped. A military vehicle with the red letters "Mine Clearance" on its sides hurried to the location of the dangerous find at maximum speed. The group of combat engineers was headed by the commander of a platoon of railroad troops, communist Captain Aleksandr Gavrilenko. It included Sergeant A. Zhilin and Privates V. Kartashov and Yu. Todorov as well as the driver, Private First Class Z. Parshunas. The combat engineers arrived in Kulinovka at midnight, and they were already at the bridge as soon as day broke.

Thoroughly examining the place where the brigade of the bridge train had discovered the suspicious box, Captain Gavrilenko ordered his subordinates to withdraw to a safe distance.

"If I need help, I'll call," he said to the soldiers.

Remaining alone on the bridge, Captain Gavrilenko began to dig up the mine. He worked manually, using a probe. Slowly, centimeter by centimeter, he dug deeper into the still unthawed embankment. For the soil to thaw completely and soften, he poured boiling water on it from a teakettle. He took short breaks only when the boiling water in the teakettle was all gone.

After about an hour and a half the metal box was finally dug up. Captain Gavrilenko wiped his face with his palm and began to study its casing. It was a German delayed-action demolition mine or, as the specialists call it, an OMZD. Only here was it learned that it is an intermediate charge. Beneath it was another box--with 30 kilograms of TNT. Discovering the wire which goes from the electric fuze toward the bridge, Gavrilenko surmised--there is one more charge alongside it. And that is how it subsequently turned out. Exactly the same "set" was found later within several meters.

Determining the system of the first mine's detonating mechanism, Captain Gavrilenko unexpectedly discovered: a mine with a "booby trap." Speaking in the language of the instructions, "a dangerously-explosive object with an element of nonremovability." In such cases, the combat engineers proceed strictly in accordance with the requirements of the documents--they destroy the dangerously-explosive object which is intended for nonremovability directly on the spot.

What is to be done? Captain Gavrilenko decided to remain on the bridge and continue the dangerous work. His subordinates continuously followed the commander's every movement, ready to come to his aid at any moment.

...The click of the detonating mechanism made a barely audible noise, but it seemed like a shot to Captain Gavrilenko. It rushed into his consciousness in a flash: The electrical circuit is closed, and if the batteries have not run down, in an instant...." But no explosion occurred. As the experienced combat engineer had supposed, time had done its work: the electrical batteries had failed.

In a few minutes, the clock mechanism with the face on which were punched the eagle and swastika lay on the ground. Only now did Captain Gavrilenko understand that the mine fuze was actuated after a 40-year interval, evidently from the vibration of the pneumatic drill during the repair work on the bridge. Only two hours remained to the planned explosion....

Captain Gavrilenko disarmed the second mine, this time with Private Kartashov who was recently awarded the badge, "For Mine Clearance." Soon the contents of the box were carefully laid out in a vehicle body with sand. The driver, Private First Class Parshyunas, carefully drove the lethal load far beyond the station. Then a dull explosion was heard in a deep gully--distant, safe.

Inefficiency in Technology Usage Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Apr 82 p 2

[Article by Engr-Maj Gen S. Yermilov: "Paper Well-Being: Machinery and Mechanisms Not Used with Sufficient Efficiency at a Number of Construction Jobs of the Carpathian Military District"]

[Text] It is difficult to overestimate the role which machines and mechanisms play in contemporary construction. The most difficult and labor-intensive work as well as processes which require high precision in execution, speed, and increased quality are placed on their shoulders. To use construction equipment efficiently and at a full load means working efficiently and obtaining the needed final results. Evidence of this is the service work of the chief mechanic of the Construction Directorate of the Belorussian Military District which is headed by Engineer-Colonel L. Sheleval'nik.

During the first year of the 11th Five-Year Plan the machine operators of the tower cranes at the district's construction jobs erected dozens of residential houses with a total area of more than 200,000 square meters. In other words, there are three five-story houses for each tower crane. Vehicle-mounted cranes, bulldozers, and excavators were used just as efficiently. And thanks to this in many respects, the district's builders regularly cope with the assignment for increase in the productivity of labor and the majority of the residential houses and installations are put into operation with good quality.

The military builders of the Carpathian Military District are under virtually the same climate and production conditions. But the results are different. True, judging from the data in the reports signed by the chief of the construction directorate of the district, Engineer-Colonel A. Sharikov and other officials, it would seem that all is well with the use of machines and mechanisms: the assigned work shift coefficient is being accomplished, there is no idling, and fuels and lubricants are being saved.

However, the people's controllers disclosed quite a different picture here. It turned out that the reporting indices were clearly exaggerated and the favorable figures arose as the result of additions. As was learned, the foremen, construction superintendents, and sector chiefs added two to four hours of time to the machine operators more than was actually worked virtually daily in the accounting documents (in shift reports, work-accounting logs).

For example, during one month the foreman of the sand pit, Soviet Army employee B. Kordiyako, added more than 100 hours of unworked time with his generous hand to two excavator crews. One can easily imagine the amount of loss from such "bounties" if it is considered that hundreds of machines and mechanisms are operating at the district's construction sites.

It is appropriate to say that the additions were furthered by the fact that the labor of the machine operators is paid for everywhere by the time worked, that is, regardless of the actual volume of work performed. Let us say that a machine stands idle for some reason, and the operator is not very disturbed by it: he continues to be paid all the same. At times, the supervisor of the construction is not disturbed, either, for he easily covers his lack of administrative abilities through the additions.

Nor does an excess of construction equipment further an improvement. There is almost 30 percent more than the calculated normative requirement. It is for this very reason that the collective of machine operators headed by Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel A. Smol'yaninov was not interested in the maximum loading of each mechanism. It was much simpler for the machine operators to accomplish their plans by numbers rather than by ability.

And as a result, sad arithmetic is obtained. The number of machines and mechanisms per worker, if we take their cost, increased by seven percent in recent years while the productivity of labor rose only two percent.

The most correct indicator of the effective use of equipment is the reduction in the times to erect buildings and structures. Alas, many facilities in the Carpathian Military District are being constructed while the normative periods are being greatly exceeded. Thus, in the UNR [work supervisor's section] which is led by V. Voloshin, the increase in the time for the construction of a dormitory from 11 months to 2.5 years caused the additional expenditures of 14,000 rubles to pay for the mechanisms. And the leader of another UNR, M. Ivnitskiy, last year paid the machine operators 39,000 rubles more than envisaged by the estimate. This is what the poor management of individual supervisors costs the state.

Nor is the matter any better in the motor depots which service construction in the district. Here are examples. Last September, a group of drivers of the motor depot headed by I. Petrik was transporting sand. The drivers worked well, and the motor depot exceeded the plan. But this occurred not because people worked in a strained manner and with a full return, but as a result of the fact that hundreds of tons of cargo which were not actually transported and thousands of kilometers of runs by the vehicles were added to the trip tickets. For these kilometers which allegedly flew beneath the wheels extra wages were charged, hundreds of liters of gasoline were written off as expended, and a "faked" savings of motor capacity, fuels, and lubricants was obtained.

By the way, about economy. In the mechanization UNR, for example, which is headed by Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel V. Dem'yanko, in September 1981 alone the specialists contrived to "save" 34,700 liters of solar oil. How? Also through added hours of construction equipment operation.

For the sake of fairness, it should be said that in the district there are many examples of how technical and engineering personnel of construction sites organize labor skillfully and creatively and manage zealously. Engineer-Captain Ya. Darmogray organized the work of tower cranes in accordance with a new, progressive method on the construction of housing. The brigade contract method, a high return from the machines, and a number of technical improvements in the assembly of the houses "from the wheels" permitted doubling the productivity of the tower cranes and bringing the performance standards of the military builders to 140-145 percent. This experience deserves broad dissemination in the Carpathian as well as in other military districts, in the fleets, and at centrally subordinated construction jobs.

"Great possibilities," Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev indicated at the 26th CPSU Congress, "are opened up by an improvement in the use of production capacities--machines, equipment and means of transportation. A reduction in idle time, an increase in the shift coefficient, the creation of technological schemes which save energy and materials -- this is what efforts should be concentrated upon."

The military construction collectives of the Carpathian Military District have all objective conditions and capabilities to accomplish these tasks successfully. For this, it is necessary that the supervisors of construction jobs and mechanization and motor transport collectives display greater organization and have a more acute sense of responsibility for the assigned matter.

As a result of the measures adopted by the district commander and the military council, political indoctrinal and organizational work among the machine operators has been intensified. The situation at the district's construction jobs is being straightened out. However, we cannot fail to mention that the shortcomings which have been discovered in the work of the Carpathianites are also inherent in many other collectives of military builders. Therefore, now all administrative activity of construction job supervisors should be imbued with concern for the efficient use of construction equipment and motor transport. Nor should the party organizations and people's controller groups and posts forget about this, either.

Military Construction in 1st Year of 11th Five-Year Plan

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 May 82 p 2

[Article by Engr-Col G. Bereznyak, chief economist of Main Directorate of Military Construction, Soviet Ministry of Defense: "Main Reserve"]

[Text] The collectives of the construction organizations of Glavvoyenstroy [Main Directorate of Military Construction] of the Soviet Ministry of Defense have been assigned difficult missions in the 11th Five-Year Plan. Along with putting buildings and structures into operation in good time, they are to raise the economy of construction, its efficiency, and its quality to a new level.

It is namely this decisive transition to the primarily intensive factors of growth, as Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed in a report at the May (1982) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, that now forms the basis of the party's economic policy.

During the first year of the five-year plan the collectives of military builders of the Belorussian, Odessa, and Leningrad Military Districts and the Black Sea Fleet reduced the production cost of construction by seven or more percent. An analysis shows that the success of the matter is accompanied first of all by the use of the main reserve, and namely--by a steady increase in the productivity of labor at the construction sites and in the shops and auxiliary production works.

Highly productive labor permits the systematic overaccomplishment of the plan for volume as well as for turning over finished commodity production to the customers, and this means obtaining a profit in amounts sufficient to create the necessary funds for economic incentive. However, the conditions for such labor have still not been created everywhere. The collectives of the construction directorates of the Kiev and North Caucasus Military Districts have been standing below their capabilities for level of labor productivity for a long time, and this inhibits the growth in economic indicators and has a negative influence on all aspects of the life and economic activity of the collectives without exception. Just what predetermines such different final results under comparably identical working conditions?

You do not answer this question unambiguously. In fact, the high return from labor is caused by the realization of a broad complex of many-faceted measures. In the Construction Directorate of the Belorussian Military District, for example, the efficiency of construction is raised primarily through a growth in labor productivity. Just how was this attained?

For many years already more than a third of the volumes of work is accomplished here by the brigade contract method. The followers of N. Zlobin provide an output which is one and a half times to twice greater than in the brigades which work in the old way. The workers of the district's construction jobs and their leaders believe in this method unconditionally and are introducing it ever more widely. At many construction sites the innovators have gone farther--they are now putting into operation the multiple flow-line brigade contract in which the work of a chain of several cost-accounting collectives is subordinate to a single goal--the most rapid construction of the facility and putting it into operation with the minimum possible expenditures and, as they say, "ready for turnover."

The construction collectives of the Belorussian Military District also outstripped others in the matter of industrialization of construction. Long ago they were already employing combined prefabricated elements and structural elements, assemblies, and parts which permitted raising the level of industrialization of work on residential construction to 81.5 percent. We also have many other progressive undertakings which contribute to efficient work.

The collective of the UNR [work supervisor's section] led by Engineer-Colonel N. Karpovich became the initiator of a movement for steady work rhythm and the uniform putting of residential houses into operation throughout the year. And the contract brigade headed by winner of the USSR State Prize worker of the Soviet Army A. Sasim proposed a new form of competition of the cost-accounting brigades--on the basis of an agreement for comradely labor competition. Stepping forth as the initiator, the brigade itself also climbed to a new step. Last year it constructed five residential multi-apartment houses with good and excellent quality, reducing the standard times for

construction by 107 days. Here, much construction material was saved and the estimated cost of the houses as a whole was reduced by 31,000 rubles.

Much that is advanced is also introduced at the construction jobs of the Kiev Military District. However, in the 10th Five-Year Plan the Kievites' productivity of labor increased considerably more slowly than was envisioned in the plans. The commodity output per worker did not even reach the mean branch mark. There are several reasons for this. But the main one is that along with the shock work of two or three leading collectives nevertheless the backward organization of labor in other UNR's predominates, in particular in those headed by Engineer-Colonel A. Merinov and Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel O. Pimenov. Here, the fragmentation of resources and means among a large number of facilities being constructed simultaneously is permitted, they violate the times for their erection for the sake of obtaining "volume" without completing the construction of some buildings, and they initiated work on others. These shortcomings are being eliminated.

The military builders of the Leningrad and Odessa Military Districts have indicators of labor productivity and profitability of production which are higher than the mean-branch indicators. In large measure, this is caused by their introduction of the automated system for production control (ASPC). Thus, the "Demand" system provides calculations for making up sets to provide all facilities under construction with the necessary material and technical resources. Introduction of the ASPC gives the collective headed by Engineer-Colonel A. Bashkevich the capability of obtaining an annual savings of 250,000-300,000 rubles.

At the same time, in the majority of the construction collectives, as a rule, individual enthusiasts are occupied with the introduction of the computer into the control mechanism. As an organizational and personnel matter, this problem has not been solved almost anywhere. In the capital construction system of our ministry, there is not even a single structural classifier for facilities under construction. And in no way can we get by without such a classifier which is suitable for employment in all components of construction. As early as the planning stage, each facility should be classified according to a specific special code of representative facilities which subsequently should be indicated in technical documentation, in title lists of construction jobs, and so forth. A single classifier will be created by our central military planning--the use of electronic computer equipment in the control of production is proceeding more successfully.

The productivity of labor is growing from year to year at the construction jobs of the Far East Military District. And this is not by chance. There subunit commanders and party and trade union organizations are accomplishing a common task jointly and harmoniously--they are improving the organization of construction.

But then, in the North Caucasus, Transcaucasus, and Transbaykal Military Districts and in the Northern Fleet the concern of the leaders for a rise in the return from labor has weakened noticeably. Here, a number of subunits are accomplishing the production standards by only 80-90 percent. Commanders of military construction detachments and leaders of construction projects are operating individually, due to which the personnel stand idle and confusion occurs at the facilities. In these collectives, proper attention is not paid to the introduction of the brigade cost-accounting contract either. There are many other omissions here, too.

I present the following example. Engineer-Colonel I. Brodskiy (Transcaucasus Military District) worked out special tables which make it possible to determine analytically the optimum distances for the delivery of materials to the construction jobs by various types of transport. However, this methodology is not finding practical application. The innovation is encountering obstacles of every possible kind, and this is one of the reasons for the unprofitableness of the work.

To a large degree, the level of labor productivity is predetermined by the capacity and reliability of the material-technical base itself. However, the reconstruction of plants for ferroconcrete articles in the North Caucasus Military District has dragged on for many years. In 1981, capital investments allocated for the construction of plants for the production base in the Transbaykal Military District and in the Northern and Pacific Fleets have not been put into production, which creates the preconditions for nonaccomplishment of the plan for capital construction in subsequent years.

Without increasing the capacities of the plants which produce precast feronconcrete and metal and wood structural elements, we do not have the possibility to raise to a higher stage the level of industrialization of construction and, consequently, its efficiency.

It is impossible to imagine the contemporary construction job without powerful, highly productive mechanisms and successful labor without their efficient use. Unfortunately, the trend is being displayed more and more widely recently in which expenditures on the operation of construction equipment are growing more rapidly than labor productivity. In the construction directorate where the chief is Engineer-Colonel V. Imadze, expenditures on mechanization increased during recent years while labor productivity remained at its former level. This inevitably entailed an increase in the cost of work performed and unprofitable production.

At many military construction sites, a large volume of work is nevertheless accomplished manually. Trimming work in digging trenches and ditches is absolutely insufficiently mechanized. Manual labor is employed in large amounts in loading and unloading operations. The absence of machines and mechanisms for various auxiliary work is felt especially strongly.

The growth in labor productivity is also inseparable from such a factor as raising the quality of work being accomplished. Due to the low qualifications of individual builders, defective work, incomplete work, and deviations from the plan are often committed at the facilities. And frequently all these negative facts do not receive a principled evaluation. In this way, the reasons which entail the necessity for alterations and repeated accomplishment of the very same work are not eliminated, which inevitably leads to a reduction in the return from labor.

In connection with this, the question of organizing technical training everywhere is acute. Perhaps, it would be expedient to expand the network of our training sub-units. Under conditions of the efficiently-planned highly-organized day, the training of the military builders can be accomplished in three to four months. Of course, here the number of those working on the facilities is reduced somewhat. But, as calculations show, in the end this will provide an unquestioned economic impact and will raise the quality of construction to a higher stage.

The party requires construction quickly, economically, and at a contemporary technical level. And each military-building collective and each administrative supervisor is required to use the main reserve which is also accessible to all for the attainment of this goal--an increase in the productivity of labor and an improvement in the quality of work.

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DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

DOSAAF OFFICIALS PRESENT AWARDS

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 24 Mar 82 p 1

[Article: "Awards for the Front-Runners"]

[Text] A meeting of the activists of the Moscow city defense organization took place. The chairman of the Central Committee of DOSAAF USSR, Hero of the Soviet Union Admiral G. Yegorov, awarded the Moscow DOSAAFites the Challenge Red Banner of the VTsSPS [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions], the Komsomol Central Committee, and the Central Committee of DOSAAF USSR for first place in the all-union socialist competition and the Challenge Red Banner of the Central Committee of DOSAAF USSR for high indices in training specialists for the Soviet Armed Forces.

In his speech, the admiral of the fleet noted that the Moscow DOSAAF organization is making a weighty contribution to the cause of the All-Union Defense Society. For several years in a row already it has been confidently achieving high and stable results in work and is moving in the vanguard of the competition among the country's defense collectives.

The successful accomplishment of the planned assignments and socialist obligations was achieved thanks to the specific direction and constant attention to matters of the defense organization on the part of the CPSU city committee, the ispolkom of the city Soviet of People's Deputies, and rayon party and Soviet organs.

The daily activity of many rayon committees and DOSAAF primary organizations is characterized by purposefulness and the specific nature in the conduct of mass-defense and military-patriotic measures and in training the workers, and especially the youth, for the defense of the socialist fatherland. The primary organizations of the motor vehicle plant imeni I. A. Likhachev, the "AZLK" motor vehicle plant imeni the Lenin Komsomol, the "Salyut" machine-building plant, the 41st Secondary School of Gagarinskiy rayon, and others are exemplary.

The Volgogradskaya, Kiev, and Krasnopresnenskaya motor vehicle schools became examples of culture, order, and discipline. In such DOSAAF schools the youth successfully acquires a technical specialty and receives ideological and physical tempering.

Next the chairman of DOSAAF USSR stressed that the defense organization is to accomplish difficult, large-scale tasks in the period of preparation for the glorious jubilee--the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR.

The speech of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, L. I. Brezhnev, at the 17th Trade Union Congress set forth the tasks for a further rise in our country's economic and defensive might.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's brilliant speech provided a powerful impulse for a rise in the labor and public activity of the Soviet people and inspired them to new achievements.

The interests of a further improvement in military-patriotic indoctrination and mass-defense, training, and sports work require of all DOSAAF committees and leaders of schools and clubs high organization and clarity, persistence and initiative, and a creative attitude toward the matter. Just as formerly, it is necessary to introduce widely the voluntary service principle in all structural elements of DOSAAF and, at the same time, to hold firmly to the course for raising personal responsibility for the organization of rhythmic work and the unconditional accomplishment of all planned assignments and socialist obligations.

In conclusion, Fleet Admiral G. Yegorov expressed the confidence that, being guided by the requirements of the 26th Party Congress and the November (1981) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the DOSAAF committees and organizations of the city of Moscow will, in the future too, march confidently in the vanguard of the competitors and serve as an example of highly-effective military-patriotic, mass-defense, training, and sports work.

At the meeting of the activists the chairman of the Moscow DOSAAF gorkom, Major General D. Kuznetsov, gave a report on the status of socialist competition in the defense collectives in light of the decisions of the 26th Party Congress and the November (1981) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and on measures for its further development and the tasks for a worthy greeting for the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR.

The following spoke in the debates: the chairman of the DOSAAF Proletarskiy rayon committee M. Naumov, the director of the Krasnopresnenskaya model motor vehicle school N. Mashkara, the chairman of the DOSAAF committee of the "Optyt" machine-building plant imeni A. N. Tupolev V. Ivanov, the chairman of the DOSAAF Pervomayskiy rayon committee N. Nekrasov, and the city military commissar Major General F. Illarionov.

The following took part in the meeting of the activists: the executive of the CPSU Central Committee N. Dolgin, the deputy chairman of the ispolkom of the Moscow Soviet A. Kostenko, the deputy commander of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District Lieutenant General N. Neyelov, and the secretary of the Komsomol gorkom M. Yeliseykin.

Leningrad

The deputy chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, Lieutenant General V. Mosyaykin, awarded the Challenge Pennant of the VTsSPS, the Komsomol Central Committee, and the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee at the meeting of the activists of the DOSAAF organization of Leningrad and the oblast for successes in the all-union socialist competition in 1981.

The meeting's participants discussed the report of the chairman of the DOSAAF committee of Leningrad and the oblast, Hero of the Soviet Union I. Dubyaga, on the results of accomplishment of the socialist obligations in 1981 and the tasks for a further rise in the effectiveness and quality of mass-defense work in light of the requirements of the 26th Party Congress.

The speaker and those who spoke in the debates--N. Lazutkin, M. Luk'yanov, A. Yakovlev, V. Rybushkin, and B. Pinus devoted great attention to the development of competition in honor of the USSR's 60th anniversary. In the vanguard of the competitors are the Leninskiy and Tikhvinskiy rayon DOSAAF organizations, the primary organization of "Elektrosila" electrical machine-building PO [production association] imeni S. M. Kirov, and DOSAAF motor vehicle school No 1. The patriotic movement under the slogan, "Each Komsomol-youth brigade--a brigade of valiant labor and excellent mass-defense work," is gathering strength at the enterprises.

An exacting conversation took place at the meeting on implacability toward shortcomings, the complete use of reserves, the introduction of advanced experience, and pulling the laggards up to the level of the leaders. The Sestroretsk, Petrodvorets, Lodeynopol'skiy, Podporozh'ye, and Boksitogorsk DOSAAF organizations, which have been lagging behind for a long time, were subjected to criticism.

Kuybyshev

High results in socialist competition were attained by the DOSAAF organization of Kuybyshevskaya oblast. The ranks of the defense collective grew. Last year, almost four-fifths of the draftees completed the schools only with excellent grades. About 33,000 specialists were trained for the national economy at DOSAAF courses. The mass nature of technical and military-applied types of sport increased.

A meeting of the oblast's defense activists took place at which the course of accomplishment of the obligations and tasks of the defense collectives for a worthy greeting for the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR were discussed. The chairman of the DOSAAF obkom, V. Glebskiy, gave a report.

At the meeting of the activists, member of the presidium bureau of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee and chief of directorate of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee, A. Kunilov, awarded the Challenge Red Banner of the VTSSPS, Komsomol Central Committee, and the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee to the defense collective.

Ufa

The DOSAAF organization of the Bashkir ASSR completed the first year of the 11th Five-Year Plan with good results. A ponderable contribution to the accomplishment of planned assignments and socialist obligations was made by the DOSAAF organizations of the cities of Oktyabr'skiy, Ufa, Belebey, and Neftekamsk, Sterlibashevskiy, Aurgazinskiy, and Meleuzovskiy rayons, Ufa model motor vehicle school No 2, and the sports-technical club of the Leninskiy rayon, Ufa.

A meeting of the autonomous republic's defense activists took place. Noting the achievements, the chairman of the society's obkom Sh. Minigulov, who spoke in the debates, concentrated main attention on unresolved problems.

Chief of directorate of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee, V. Suvorov, spoke at the meeting. He gave an award to the defense collective of Bashkiria for successes in socialist competition among the kray and oblast DOSAAF organizations of the Russian Federation--the Challenge Cup of the VTsSPS, Komsomol Central Committee, and the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee.

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DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

PRESIDIUM USSR DOSAAF CENTRAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSES PROBLEMS, IMPROVEMENTS

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 24 Mar 82 p 3

[Article: "For Further Improvement in Mass-Defense Work"]

[Text] Questions concerning a further improvement in the activity of the country's defense organizations were discussed at the regular session of the presidium of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee.

For successes in training specialists for the Soviet Armed Forces in the 1980/81 training year, the presidium of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee awarded the Challenge Red Banner and certificate of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee to the defense organizations of the Ukrainian and Georgian SSR's, Rostovskaya oblast, and the city of Moscow. The certificate of honor of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee was awarded to the DOSAAF organizations of the Armenian, Lithuanian, and Uzbek SSR's, the Tatar ASSR, Volgogradskaya, Kuybyshevskaya, Omskaya, Bryanskaya, Penzenskaya, and Smolenskaya oblasts, and Leningrad and the oblast.

In the decree, "On the results of DOSAAF's international ties for the years 1977-1981 and measures for their further strengthening," it was noted that in recent years some measures have been conducted which are directed toward a further strengthening of solidarity and international friendship with defense and sports organizations of the socialist countries. An exchange of experience in working with fraternal organizations was conducted at all levels and for all branches of activity. An agreement of friendship and collaboration for the years 1981-1985 was signed.

The decree which was adopted outlines measures for the further strengthening of fraternal friendship and collaboration with the defense and sports organizations of the socialist countries.

Having listened to and discussed the report of the deputy chairman of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee, Lieutenant General A. Shilin, "On the status and measures to improve the operation of motor vehicle equipment and intensify the struggle against road transport accidents in the DOSAAF organizations," the presidium of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee noted that these questions are being resolved most successfully by the DOSAAF Central Committees of the Armenian and Lithuanian SSR's and the Kalmytskaya, Kurganskaya, Mordovskaya, Novgorodskaya, and Smolenskaya DOSAAF obkoms.

At the same time, it is noted in the decree, the number of road transport accidents is not decreasing in several kray and oblast DOSAAF organizations. There were even serious motor vehicle catastrophes. This occurs primarily because individual committees do not display high demandingness toward the chiefs of subordinate training and sports organizations in questions of using the equipment and traffic safety. The educational capabilities of socialist competition are poorly used.

The presidium made it incumbent upon the DOSAAF committees to adopt decisive measures for the elimination of the shortcomings which have been noted and the improvement of operation of motor vehicle equipment and motor pool service in subordinate organizations.

The question of the committees' implementation of the decisions of the 8th All-Union DOSAAF Congress and the decree of the 4th (1979) plenum of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee on improving the material and technical support of the society's committees and organizations was discussed. It was noted that in those DOSAAF organizations where there is a material-technical base mass-defense work, the training of specialists for the Armed Forces and the national economy, and the development of technical and military-applied types of sport are basically well organized.

At the same time, in some DOSAAF committees and organizations persistent work is not conducted on improving the supply and realization of stocks of material resources. Problems in the maintenance of records, timeliness in presenting reports to the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee, and substantiation of requisitions for equipment, property, and materials are monitored poorly. In individual committees, measures are not undertaken for the development of the material-technical base and the construction and repair of warehouses are not conducted.

The presidium of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee discussed the results of accomplishment of the society's financial plan for the 10th Five-Year Plan and approved the society's financial plan for the years 1981-1985 and the defense society's budget for 1982.

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DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

MORE AWARDS PRESENTED BY DOSAAF OFFICIALS

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 28 Mar 82 p 1

[Article: "Presenting Awards"]

[Text] Moskovskaya Oblast

Participants in the meeting of activists of the Moscow defense organization discussed the report of the chairman of the DOSAAF obkom, Major General G. Konobeyev, on further development of socialist competition in the defense collectives in light of the decisions of the 26th Party Congress and the November (1981) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and on the tasks for a worthy greeting for the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR.

The report analyzed the experience in ensuring the effectiveness of competition in the leading Podol'sk, Zagorsk, and Pavlovo-Posadskiy city DOSAAF organizations and the Taldomskiy rayon DOSAAF organization, the Dmitrov and Shatura motor vehicle schools, and the Kolomna Aviation sport club, and the reasons for shortcomings in the work of some committees of city and rayon defense collectives were disclosed.

In their speeches the chairman of the primary organization of the Chekhovskiy furniture combine, K. Khisyametdinov, the chief of the Dmitrov motor vehicle school, M. Stepanenko, the chairman of the Pavlovo-Posadskiy gorkom, V. Smorodinkin, and others told about the course of preparations for the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR in the defense collectives.

The first deputy chairman of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee, Colonel General A. Odintsov, awarded the oblast organization the Challenge Pennant of the VTsSPS [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions], the Komsomol Central Committee, and the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee for successes in the all-union socialist competition.

The executive of the CPSU obkom, V. Romanyuk, the secretary of the Komsomol obkom, A. Makushkin, and the secretary of the oblast trade union council, P. Nosov, took part in the meeting.

Rostov-na-Donu

A conference of the party-administrative activists of Rostovskaya oblast took place. Taking part in its work were the executives of the CPSU obkom and the ispolkom of the

oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, of city and rayon party and Soviet organs, secretaries of Komsomol gorkoms and raykoms, leaders of organs of popular education, city and rayon military commissars, and chairmen of rayon and city DOSAAF committees.

The secretary of the CPSU obkom, M. Teslya, gave a report, "On the status of military-patriotic and mass-defense work and the training of the youth for service in the Soviet Armed Forces, and measures for its further improvement in light of the requirements of the 26th CPSU Congress."

The speaker and those who took part in the debates stressed that under the direction of party and Soviet organs and in close cooperation with the trade union, Komsomol, and organs of popular education the defense society is struggling persistently for the accomplishment of the tasks which follow from the decisions of the 26th Party Congress and the November (1981) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and a noticeable improvement in mass-defense and sports work was attained.

For the attainment of high results in the all-union socialist competition in 1981, the Rostovskaya oblast DOSAAF organization has been awarded the Challenge Red Banner of the VTsSPS, Komsomol Central Committee, and the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee. This award and the Challenge Red Banner of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee were presented for successes in the training of specialists for the Armed Forces by chief of directorate of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee, Yu. Utkin. He also presented the Challenge Red Banner of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee to the Rostov aviation sports club for successes in mastering new equipment and training highly qualified sportsmen.

The chairman of the DOSAAF obkom, Major General I. Kondratov, expressed the sincere thanks of the VTsSPS, Komsomol Central Committee, and the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee for the high evaluation of the work of the Don DOSAAFites. He assured the CPSU obkom and the ispolkom of the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies that the oblast defense organization will mark the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR by a further rise in all military-patriotic, mass-defense, training, and sports work.

Bryansk

A military-patriotic soiree took place in the House for Political Education of the CPSU obkom. At it, the deputy chairman of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee, Engineer-Major General V. Zemlyannikov, presented representatives of the defense society's oblast organization the Challenge Pennant of the VTsSPS, Komsomol Central Committee, and the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee with which it was rewarded for successes in military-patriotic, mass-defense, training, and sports work which were attained in the all-union socialist competition in 1981.

The following spoke at the meeting: the chairman of the DOSAAF obkom, F. Kolesnikov, the secretary of the Volodarskiy CPSU raykom, L. Belokopytova, the chief of the Zhukovka DOSAAF motor vehicle school, P. Petrushin, the deputy chairman of the committee of the DOSAAF primary organization of the Novozybkovskiy machine-tool building plant, F. Aliyeva, USSR master of sport G. Voskresenskaya, and the oblast military commissar, Major General P. Pyatlin.

The secretary of the CPSU obkom, M. Kovalev, spoke at the conclusion.

The soiree was attended by members of the party obkom bureau, executives of the CPSU obispolkom and gorkom and gorispolkom, leaders of trade-union, Komsomol, and other public organizations, and workers and activists of the oblast DOSAAF organization.

Tula

Measures for the further improvement of the leadership of DOSAAF training organizations were discussed at a plenum of the Tul'skaya obkom of the defense society. The oblast military commissar, Major General A. Dobrovolskiy, the chief of the Bogorodskaya motor vehicle school, A. Vetritskiy, and others spoke on the report of the deputy obkom chairman, A. Maslennikov.

For successes in the all-union socialist competition the defense society's Tul'skaya oblast organization was awarded the Challenge Cup of the VTsSPS, the Komsomol Central Committee, and the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee. The award was presented by member of the bureau of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee presidium and chief of directorate of the DOSAAF Central Committee, P. Grishchuk.

The deputy chief of department of the CPSU obkom, A. Artem'yev, and the secretary of the Komsomol obkom, I. Nikitin, took part in the work of the plenum.

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DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

PROBLEMS WITH MILITARY COMMISSARIATS AIRED

Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 13 Apr 82 p 2

[Article by L. Sharashenizde, military commissar, Georgian SSR: "Lofty Civil Duty"]

[Text] I have a letter before me. Signed by a unit commander and the political officer, it tells how Private Dzhambuli Gvaramiya is performing army service excellently. Prior to entering the army, he worked on a Sukhumi construction job and, at the same time, he studied in an institute. He made friends with sports from childhood. Efficient, smart looking, he immediately joined the army family and, as a candidate party member, he became the reliable assistant of commanders in the indoctrination of the soldiers. With his assistance, many young soldiers firmly mastered the skills of tank driving.

The army school. It teaches a person much: discipline and self-control, will and bravery, a sense of collectivism and mutual assistance. It teaches high responsibility for the fate of the motherland and for what is dearest for the Soviet person--peace on Earth.

In accordance with the law on the universal military obligation which reflected a new stage in the organizational development of our country's Armed Forces, a clear system of ideological-political and military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth, primary military and predraft training of youths, and the training of specialists for the Armed Forces in the system of vocational training and through the DOSAAF training organizations has been worked out. And in all this many-faceted work, the most important role is played by the military commissariats.

They are linked with the enterprises and construction jobs, kolkhozes and sovkhozes, educational institutions, and the families of Soviet people by thousands of threads. Their activity is one of the graphic manifestations of the triumph of the Lenin behests on the unity of the army and the people.

The Rustavi city military commissariat which is headed by Colonel B. Butskhrikidze, for example, organizes its work in an interesting manner. The quality of the training of the youth for army service is growing here from year to year. The majority of the draftees master military specialties and obtain GTO [Ready for Labor and Defense] badges and sports ratings. An assistance committee is working actively with the military commissariat. And it is not without reason that this military commissariat

has been awarded the Challenge Red Banner of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the Georgian SSR as well as the Challenge Red Banner of the Military Council, Transcaucasus Military District.

The military commissar, Colonel O. Balashov, enjoys deserved authority among the residents of Zavodskiy rayon, Tbilisi. He is distinguished by high devotion to party principle, demandingness toward himself and his subordinates, and sensitivity and responsiveness to people. In his daily matters, he constantly relies on party, trade union, and Komsomol organizations and on the broad group of activists from among the reserve and retired officers.

The Leninskiy rayon military commissariat of Tbilisi (military commissar O. Tavberidze) and many other commissariats are known by their achievements in military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth and the accomplishment of other tasks assigned to them.

All this is finding a good response among the people. Gratitude to the military commissariats is expressed by front-line soldiers for warm congratulations on a holiday and for assistance in the effective solution of the problem of repairing housing, by servicemen of the reserve--for assistance in finding jobs and providing dwelling space, by the residents of a mountain village--for an interesting talk about the modern army, and by the parents of a difficult teenager--for beneficial influence on a son.

But, unfortunately, the work of some military commissariats nevertheless does not meet the requirements of the day. The high quality of training the youth for military service is not ensured everywhere, the accounting for human and national-economic resources is not properly organized, and at times letters and applications of the workers are considered formally and bureaucratically. These shortcomings characterize the activity of the Ambrolauri, Aspindza, Akhalkalaki, Akhmeta, Gerechkorskiy, Dmanisi, Kvareli, Lagodekhi, Sachkhhere, Tianeti, Tsalendzhikha, Tsalka, and several other military commissariats.

A certain system has developed for work with reserve servicemen in the rayon and city military commissariats. Here, they are always ready to help them in finding work and directing them to studies. To supplement knowledge and increase military skill, the military commissariats periodically organize training-methods assemblies of the men in the reserve, the program of which is drawn up with consideration of their level of training. As a rule, these assemblies take place in an organized manner and provide good results. But at the same time, we cannot fail mention the following facts. Often official papers reach the military commissariats from some organizations with requests of this type: "In the interests of accomplishment of the plan by the enterprise, we request the release of reservists from the training assemblies...." And then follows a list of names of people who were given call-up papers the day before. What does such intercession indicate? First of all, that some administrative leaders have not fully understood the requirements of the law on the universal military obligation and display an inexcusable narrow departmental approach to a matter of state importance. Second, this shows the passivity of the military commissariat itself and its weak ties with the enterprises and organizations. Such reproach can be addressed with full justification to the Akhalkalaki, Bogdanovka, Kareli, Khashuri, and Tsalka rayon military commissariats as well as to some military commissariats of Tbilisi.

Together with the DOSAAF organizations, civil defense staffs, and in close contact with the administration of enterprises and party, trade union, and Komsomol organizations the military commissariats are called upon constantly to keep in their field of view questions of raising the level of military knowledge of the reserve servicemen using for this all work forms which have been tested in practice.

The tasks posed by the 26th CPSU Congress to strengthen the defensive might of the country and its Armed Forces require the improvement of the entire system of the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth and its comprehensive preparation for service in the Soviet Army.

In recent years the military commissariats of the republic, with the active assistance of party and Soviet organs and the administration of many associations, enterprises, and organizations have done much to put in order the accounting for reservists. Thus, military-accounting work is well organized in Leningradskiy rayon of the capital, in particular, at the Tbilisi machine-tool building plant imeni Kirov, in the "Elektroapparat" association and the Scientific Research Institute for the Food Industry, and in the zone of the city of Gagra, Kobuletskiy, Makharadzevskiy, Sagaredzhoyskiy rayons, the Kolobanskiy rural Soviet of Abashskiy rayon, and others.

At the same time, as a check showed, the leaders of several enterprises, organizations, and institutions as well as personnel departments are not devoting proper attention to questions of accounting for reservists and at times are not very familiar with the basic requirements of the documents which exist in this regard. Such shortcomings occur in Oktyabr'skiy and Zavodskiy rayons of the city of Tbilisi, "Gruzgiprogorstroy" [expansion unknown] planning institute, and Akhmetovskiy, Kazbegskiy, Karel'skiy, and Khashurskiy rayons of the republic.

A clear procedure exists in which the registration and discharge of citizens by place of residence in accordance with the law on the universal military obligation is accomplished only with the presence of marks of the military commissariats in military-registration documents as well as in the housekeeping book concerning the acceptance or dropping of reservists and draftees from military registration. This information should also be considered by the managers of enterprises and organizations when accepting people for work. Meanwhile, for some reasons these simple rules are sometimes forgotten. Thus, proper order has not been brought about in the matter of the registration and dropping of reservists and draftees in the dormitories of the "Isani" shoe factory and "Gruzneft" [Georgian Petroleum] association, and the plant imeni Dmitrov. Of course, all this complicates the work of the military commissariats and interferes with the observance of military-accounting discipline.

The leaders of associations, enterprises, organizations, institutions, and educational institutions are required personally to head military-accounting work. During the drawing up of documents when accepting reservists and draftees for work, personal cards must be prepared in accordance with a special form.

This year, when the entire Soviet people are preparing to mark the great and bright celebration of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR solemnly, we should not only consolidate what has been achieved, but should also attain higher positions

in the development of the economy, in social transformations, and in strengthening the defensive might of our socialist fatherland. For the will of the peoples for peace to be a real force, it is necessary to strengthen our defensive potential in every possible way and instill thoughtfully in a person the best features of the citizen-patriot and a readiness to defend the great achievements of socialism.

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DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

DOSAAF SPORTS PROBLEM IN GLASS FACTORY

Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 15 Apr 82 p 4

[Article by L. Koval', Kishinev: "Indifference"]

[Text] In 1974, a motor sport section was created in our plant. The DOSAAF city committee provided motorcycles.

And after only two years, our team became the winner of the all-union motorcross for the Yuriy Gagarin prize and won first place in the republic. This success attracted to the section pupils of the assisted School 44 and GPTU [expansion unknown]-36.

But then a new director came to the plant. At first, he "asked" us to find a new refuge for ourselves. We persuaded him to give us a half basement which was strewn with construction rubbish beneath one of the shops. We put it in order for an entire month: we carried out the rubbish, made windows and doors, and installed illumination and a water line.

But when everything was ready, the director declared that we occupied too much room and he placed an old "Volga" in the premises of the section. Soon two more vehicles appeared here. And then they demanded that we remove the motorcycles altogether in view of production necessity.

We turned to the party bureau and the plant committee for assistance, but in vain. The section, one of the best in the republic, ceased to exist.

It is difficult to understand what "production necessity" the director referred to; only private vehicles are being "billed" in the basement for a year and a half now.

Of course, I did not quit the sport after this. I drill and lead a motorcycle section on the voluntary service basis at an adjacent enterprise--"Moldavgidromash" [Moldavian Hydraulic Machine-Building]. Here the attitude toward us is most benevolent. And the youngsters are trying. Last year they became city champions and

won second place in the all-union cross-country race in memory of B. Glavan in Bel'tsy.

Unquestionably, all this is pleasing. But it is distressing that there are no representatives of our glass plant among the participants in the competitions.

Regardless of how many times we started to talk about renewing the work of the section, the director does not want to listen. Moreover, he forbade releasing me for the competitions. And here, it is the second year already that I virtually do not participate in either republic or all-union competitions. This also means that I will not reach the finals of the 8th Sports Festival of the Peoples of the USSR. But you see, at the preceding two I was a prize winner and won 10 times in the Moldavian championships.

I read recently in your newspaper with what interesting matters the lives of the plant sportsmen of the Tiraspol' "Elektromash" [Electric Machine Building] plant are filled. I became envious. We have nothing like it.

G. Marku, mechanic of the glass plant, master of sport of the USSR

It was the time of the dinner break when the letter's author and I dropped in at one of the dusty dressing rooms of the glass plant. About 10 people were crowded over a long table. Excited shouts and the rattling of dice.... The matter was clear: "dominoes."

"This is the most mass 'type of sport' at the plant," my companion noted sadly.

We climbed up a steep flight of stairs to the second floor. The section of control and measurement instruments and automatic devices is located here. Vladimir Kupchak is its foreman; he is the chairman of the plant's DOSAAF organization who, after becoming familiar with the letter confirmed:

"What has been written is correct. I have been at the plant since 1970. I remember, formerly in addition to the motorcycle section we had here sections for rifle marksmanship and military-applied all-around combined tournaments and a sports festival was conducted each year. After their shift, many of our workers came for drills and participated in competitions. And I, myself, worked with Marku, true, not for long--I understood that this type of sport is not for me. But then, others succeeded. They earned prizes and certificates. But in 1979, because of the absence of proper conditions to store the weapons they closed the marksmanship, and a year later--the motor section. Now our work has been reduced, in essence to the collection of membership dues."

"And are you satisfied with this?"

"Well, that is why I tried many times to get things going, to find support among the management and from the trade union. They agreed with us and promised assistance

but everything was limited to this. The director declared: the DOSAAF gorkom promised to open a section for automobile sport at the plant and deceived us. If this is so, neither do we need motorcycle sport....

Just how could it happen that at such a big enterprise of the capital they forgot about physical culture and sport altogether?

I posed this question for the board of directors, the party bureau, the plant committee, and the Komsomol committee and I heard something vague in response: well, that's not true, but....

Meanwhile, the majority of shop chiefs and their closest assistants stand wholly for physical culture and sport. By the way, many are active sportsmen themselves. The deputy director for personnel and living conditions, V. Potapov, is fond of tennis, volleyball, and basketball, the chief of the founding and machine shop, I. Blinshteyn, has a first-class rating in soccer, and V. Kupchak is a candidate master in marksmanship sport. And other production managers give their free time to sport with enthusiasm. Furthermore, when selecting personnel V. Potapov gives preference to people with a sports background.

"As a rule, they become better production workers," the deputy director considers. "Sport disciplines a person like nothing else, develops skill in him, and tempers his character as well as his health."

"Then why aren't you concerned that these people have the opportunity to continue their pursuits?"

"How can I tell you...."

It seems to me that the first reason for the stagnation of the sports life at the glass plant is concealed in this reticence of V. Potapov. It is in the inertness of the production leaders. And it was strange to hear than not one of them wants to break a lance in trying somehow to change the situation which has developed at the plant. It turns out that not once was the question of the state of physical culture and sport raised at planning sessions and short operations meetings in the office of the enterprise director, A. Kirilyuk. In the discussion of the conditions for socialist competition between shops, each time the interests of the plant's physical culturists remain outside the field of vision. Judging from everything, their successes and failures in rayon competitions and the status of physical culture work do not excite and do not disturb the plant trade union committee. One is brought to this thought by the fact that in the work plan of the trade union committee there is not one point pertaining to physical culture. And really, the Komsomol committee displays absolutely no activity in the solution of the sportsmen's problems. Not was any place found for physical culture in the program for its activity. In the portfolio with the label, "Typical range of questions being solved by the sector for sports and mass-defense work," we discovered only the final table of the plant's championship for mini-soccer conducted in November 1981.

A stand with the high-flown title, "Sport and labor are going side by side!" which "adorns" the vestibule of the plant management has been covered by the dust of time. A schedule for passing the standards for the GTO [Ready for Labor and Defense]

complex, a calendar of mass sports measures, a schedule of work for the sections dated 1981. And besides, those who drew them up--the chairman of the collective's council on physical culture, V. Morozan, and his deputy, I. Paraskan, left the plant long ago.

From all this, it becomes clear why a small sports complex consisting of three playing areas were constructed here for an entire seven years. It would have been "built" by now if it were not for the interference of the rayispolkom and the rayon sports committee. Unfortunately, sports passion just is not seething on these sports grounds. Hills of sand are rising there, and the Komsomol committee is too busy to organize the youth for the good order of the grounds. But even if the grounds are brought to order, no one will be able to play volleyball or basketball--there are no balls.

In order to convince me how much the plant trade union committee is disturbed by this problem its chairman, A. Tsalko, showed me the invoice for sports goods which was written last autumn but not authorized by Gosbank due to a lack of funds.

But today I was interested in knowing whether the plant committee had tried to solve the problem.

Tsalko shook his head negatively.

I define accurately in the plant committee the sum of the funds allocated for mass sports work.

"A thousand rubles," says Tsalko.

"And how much was expended last year"?

"Well, almost nothing. But now we are renting a swimming pool. Two health groups are occupied there! True, the bulk of the workers, of course, remain outside sports."

Self-critically. But it will not become easier for the plant physical culturists from this alone.

Similarly, the leaders of the enterprise's party organization also resigned themselves to the unenviable position of physical culture in the collective and seemed to admit their failure to change anything.

And a person who could become the pride of his collective, a skillful worker and excellent sportsman, Georgiy Marku, and many of his comrades must look for the application of their strengths at adjacent enterprises. This does not greatly please the management of the glass plant and it is constantly putting obstacles in their way.

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DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

'FORMALISM' DIRECTED AT MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 7 May 82 p 2

[Article: "Military Commissariats: Formalism Counter-Indicated"]

[Text] "A reliable defense for the peaceful labor of the Soviet people!" The socialist competition of personnel of the republic's military commissariats is taking place under this slogan in the year of the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation. The first results of this competition were discussed at republic meeting of party activists of the Georgian SSR military commissariats which took place in Tbilisi.

Those who spoke at the meeting--the republic's military commissar, Major General L. L. Sharashenidze, the chief of the political department of the Georgian SSR military commissariat, Colonel R. T. Nioradze, and representatives of the military commissariats and staff of the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District--noted with satisfaction that the Georgian military commissariats in which representatives of 25 nations and nationalities of our country are serving shoulder to shoulder are accomplishing their assigned missions successfully on the whole. Presented as an example were the military commissariats of the Adzhar ASSR, Leninskiy rayon of Tbilisi, Zestafonskiy, Marneul'skiy, and Sukhumskiy rayons, and the cities of Rustavi and Tskhaltubo.

Jointly with party and Komsomol organizations, they are conducting various measures for the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth.

The results of this work were not slow in being felt. One out of every four youths in our republic departed for the army having a military specialty, and the interest of the youth in military professions grew even more.

But at the same time, formalism has not been overcome in the work of some local organs of military control.

The military commissariats are to solve many problems jointly with other departments. Military-technical study groups are operating in far from all educational institutions, including secondary schools. Not to mention shooting galleries, and some schools do not have elementary sports apparatuses.

At times school directors prepare references for young people who have received draft registration slips formally.

The meeting of the party activists adopted a resolution which defines ways for the further improvement of the work of military commissariats.

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MILITARY SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIES

HISTORY OF MILITARY CHEMICAL DEFENSE SCHOOL CITED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 May 82 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen V. Zemzerov, chief of political department, Chemical Defense Military Academy imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko: "Loyalty to Traditions"]

[Text] The history of the Chemical Defense Military Academy imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko, just as that of any other military-educational institution, is the living embodiment of the Communist Party's tireless concern for the strengthening of the socialist state's defensive capability and the development and qualitative improvement of the Soviet Armed Forces. The academy was created in May 1932--in the period of the sharp aggravation of the international situation and the increase in the threat of a new world war.

The young military-educational institution was staffed by teaching personnel capable of combining the education and indoctrination of the students with the solution of urgent military-scientific problems. Prominent scientists became teachers of the academy: Academician E. Britske (subsequently vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences), Professors S. Voznesenskiy, B. Nekrasov, L. Soborovskiy, and V. Chelintsev, and future academicians I. Knunyants, M. Dubinin, S. Vol'fkovich, and L. Lepin'.

The student body was harmonious and serried. Yesterday's students and pupils of workers' faculties began lessons in the training center and in the classrooms and laboratories. They worked with inspiration and responsibly. The fact that we studied in a good higher educational institution and had excellent teachers, member of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Foreign Trade N. Patolichev, who concluded the academy in the pre-war years, notes in his book of memoirs, was supplemented by the saturated political and ideological life of the academy's collective and its party and Komsomol organizations.

In the pre-war years the academy made a substantial contribution to the improvement of the chemical defense of the troops and population and trained a large detachment of commanders and military chemical engineers for the troops. The scientists and teachers worked out the fundamental bases of the theories of sorption processes, means for chemical defense, the indication and decontamination of toxic chemicals, flamethrowers, and smoke equipment. Many of their discoveries were employed successfully in the national economy and medicine and contributed to the development of chemical science.

From the first days of the Great Patriotic War the academy's activity was subordinated to the needs of the front. Alumni of the academy directed the chemical service in all elements--from the large unit to the front, commanded chemical defense units, and ensured the effective employment of flamethrower-incendiary and smoke equipment. In wartime, work continued on increasing the reliability of the means of defense, new methods for indicating and decontaminating toxic chemicals were found, and spontaneously inflammable incendiary fuels for combating tanks were created. The academy's scientists participated in the interpretation of intelligence data on the concentration of chemical weapons and the means for their employment by the Hitlerites near Staraya Russa and in other places.

It is known that tremendous supplies of highly toxic chemical substances were created in Hitlerite Germany. But the fascist command did not decide to employ chemical weapons. It could not fail to consider the high state of readiness of the Soviet Army for defense against these weapons. Fear of inevitable retribution also restrained it.

The combat activity of the chemical troops received a high evaluation. Seventy-seven units were awarded orders and 40 were awarded honorary titles. For the entire duration of the war fixed attention was devoted to the protection of the troops against chemical weapons. And the fact that the active army had cadres of specialists available who were capable of organizing it competently and had an efficient chemical service and reliable means of defense is to the great credit of the academy.

Rich and strong traditions have formed in the Chemical Defense Military Academy during the half century. One of the most remarkable is the high scientific level of instruction and its party spirit. After the Great Patriotic War the training and indoctrinal process and scientific work in the academy underwent profound changes connected with the revolutionary transformations in military affairs. As a training and scientific center, the academy made a large contribution to the solution of the fundamental problems in the organizational development of the chemical troops at the new stage, their employment under conditions of nuclear-missile war, and to the creation of effective means of protection against weapons of mass destruction, radiation and chemical reconnaissance, and special processing. The training-laboratory and field base of the academy are developing consistently and its ties with the troops and scientific research institutions are strengthening. The use of electronic computers and means of automation and mechanization has become customary.

The academy's scientific potential has grown. Today about two-thirds of the teacher personnel have degrees of doctor and candidate of sciences and titles of scientist. The tone in the basic scientific studies is set by veterans of the military-educational institution and academicians of the USSR Academy of Sciences: Hero of Socialist Labor and winner of USSR state prizes M. Dubinin, Hero of Socialist Labor and winner of the Lenin Prize and USSR state prizes I. Knunyants, and Lenin Prize winner A. Fokin. Young scientists are making a ponderable contribution to science and the training of officer personnel. The results of the studies--and students also participate actively in them--are embodied in manuals and handbooks. Training materials prepared in the academy are widely used in troop practice. Hundreds of inventions and rationalizer suggestions by our teachers and students have been realized.

The professorial-teacher staff devotes great attention to problems of intensifying the training and indoctrinational process. The tactical and operational training of the students is continuously being improved. The proportion of lessons on the ground and of group exercises with the critique of specific problem situations and an analysis of possible versions of the decision increased. Strong ties between the academy and the troops, regular practical training of teachers with the troops in large units and units, the participation of teachers and students in troop exercises, and meetings with graduates help to give the instruction a practical direction and to raise the content of the training minute.

The unbreakable unity of instruction and indoctrination is in the traditions of the academy. Commanders and political officers, professors, and teachers display great concern for the ideological tempering and broad political and military horizon of their pupils and instill in them a love for their chosen military specialty, the ability to accomplish their daily duties with initiative and creativity, and a sense of personal responsibility for the reliable protection of the troops. The academy's party organization mobilizes the communists and all personnel for active socialist competition and generalizes and propagandizes the experience of its right guides.

The half-century history of the military-educational institution which was created in the years of the First Five-Year Plan is a source of pride and inspiration for thousands of its graduates and for those who are working within its walls today. For services to the Soviet state in the matter of training highly-qualified military personnel, many of the academy's scientists and teachers have been awarded orders and medals.

However, during the jubilee days the academy's collective is also devoting basic attention to unresolved problems and unused reserves. It is preparing to greet the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation with high indices in all spheres of its activity and to give the Armed Forces a new detachment of ideologically tempered, comprehensively trained officers who are boundlessly devoted to the socialist fatherland.

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MILITARY SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIES

SUBMARINERS' SCHOOL DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 May 82 p 2

[Article: "On the Compass Points of Courage"]

[Text] In the training classroom which resembles a submarine compartment, a lesson is being directed by a tactics instructor, Captain 1st Rank S. Bochkin. Fifth-course students G. Mikhaylik and S. Sukhov are performing the duties of officers as part of a ship's combat team. They are accomplishing the tasks calmly and confidently. The officer candidates recently returned from probationary training and passed many tests directly at sea.

In the vicinity, Captain 2d Rank A. Getman and Colonel of Medical Service L. Korotinskiy are conducting a lesson at the drill and practice training station. Methods for leaving a submarine in "emergency" situations are being worked out.

And it is like this in any classroom. The officer candidates of the Higher Naval School for Underwater Navigation imeni the Lenin Komsomol are preparing for the examination session which is already close.

The school, which was created in 1948, was first called the Baltic Higher Naval School. It has been called a school for underwater navigation since 1954. It has borne the name of Lenin Komsomol since November 1958.

By the way, this naval educational institution also has previous history. The Leningrad Naval Preparatory School was opened in 1944 in an ancient building on Lermontovskiy Prospekt. In it, seventh-grade boys whose childhood was scorched by the war received a secondary education and naval training necessary for successful study in the fleet's higher schools. In 1948 they also became officer candidates of the Baltic Higher Naval School.

In the school's museum, attention is attracted by a photograph of a young seaman with three "training chevrons" on the sleeve who had received the right to become a first-course student of a higher naval school. In the photograph, it is not difficult to recognize the chief of faculty, Captain 1st Rank A. Smirnov.

Many of the school's faculties and departments are headed by its former graduates. They returned to their military-educational institution having received experience in the command of submarines and departments. This is proper: the school is the basic forge of officer personnel for the Soviet submarine fleet, including teachers.

Many of the school's alumni became Heroes of the Soviet Union. One of the first heroes raised in the school for submarine navigation is A. Pavlov, at that time a rear admiral and commander of a ship. Now he is a vice admiral.

You cannot count the school's alumni who have been presented with state awards. Among them is the flag navigator of the fleet, Captain 1st Rank V. Vladimirov. For exemplary navigator support of difficult cruises he was awarded the Orders of Lenin and the Red Banner.

Within the walls of the school, the future submarine officers receive profound knowledge in higher mathematics, physics, mechanics, electrical engineering, and electronics. As a rule, they master special subjects in the senior classes. There are many of them: navigation, communication equipment, military history, naval geography, international maritime law, foreign languages.... One of the departments which arm the future officers with knowledge of the tactics of naval combat is headed by Rear Admiral V. Zhuravel'--an experienced submariner. The authority of his deputy, Captain 1st Rank S. Bochkin, is high. In the past, he was the commander of the submarine which was the first in the fleet to accomplish the launching of a ballistic missile from beneath the water.

The school imeni the Lenin Komsomol is proud of its training-material base. The future officers have at their disposal improved simulators which permit them to work out firm skills in the control of a submarine and acquire high navigator and tactical training. During training practice the officer candidates participate in long cruises. They called at Cuba, at the Mexican port of Veracruz, at Casablanca, Tunis, Latakia, Rostok, Gdynia, and other border ports.

A most important place in the program of instruction is occupied by social sciences. The Department of Marxism-Leninism has a training complex which includes a Lenin hall and offices of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, scientific communism, party-political work, and military pedagogy and psychology.

The school's library, whose holdings include more than 200,000 books, regularly organizes meetings between the officer candidates and poets, writers including the famous writer and painter of seascapes V. Konetskiy--a graduate of the school, and famous submariners who are authors of military memoirs.

The future officers of the fleet love amateur talent activities and are actively engaged in sports. The school has a remarkable sports complex with a swimming pool, rifle range, and a base of various floating equipment. Swimming, naval all-around combined tournaments, underwater sport, boxing, basketball, and volleyball are especially popular here. Among the officer candidates are 20 masters of sport and about 50 candidate masters.

The officer candidates of the Higher Naval School for Underwater Navigation imeni the Lenin Komsomol greeted the 19th Komsomol Congress with high indices in training and service. The heat of socialist competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation is increasing. The tone in it is set by the Leninist grant-aided student officer candidate S. Dovbeshko, grant-aided student of the Lenin Komsomol officer candidate V. Belousov, officer candidate G. Mikhaylik who was awarded the scholarship imeni K. Tsiolkovskiy, and Nakhimov grant-aided student officer candidate S. Kalinovskiy.

In the motherland's jubilee year the school is sending its graduates to the fleets for the 31st time. Officer candidates who are to receive diplomas soon now will depart on long cruises on the training ships "Khasan" and "Perekop." And the commanders, political officers, and teachers are already preparing for the reception of newcomers who dream of service in the Soviet submarine fleet.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

WESTERN VIEW OF ROLE OF CPSU IN MILITARY ORGANIZATION DISPUTED

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[Article by Ye. V. Skleznev and K. F. Pavlikov: "Against Bourgeois Ideology and Revisionism: Groundlessness of Contemporary Bourgeois Concept of the CPSU's Role in Soviet Military Organization"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Development of the world revolutionary process led to a radical change in the relative strengths in the world in favor of socialism. Under present-day conditions there has been a substantial reduction in imperialism's former capabilities to dominate other countries and nations unhindered. The reaction of imperialist circles to these changes and to the revolutionary renewal of the world is the same, expressed by a class hatred for socialism. While experiencing serious shocks and major failures in domestic and foreign policy and encountering the might and intelligent politics of peaceloving states headed by the USSR along the path toward accomplishing its plans of achieving world domination, international imperialism is seeking a solution in the disruption of a relaxation in international tension and in the organization of new military-political adventures.

Imperialism did not reconcile itself with the USSR's existence, but after suffering defeat in attempts to crush our country by the method of frontal military attacks, it is forced to have a look at its economic, military and spiritual might. In an attempt to return their lost superiority, the West's reactionary circles are undertaking a gigantic build-up of military preparations. Simultaneously they are shifting more and more from individual ideological subversions to organization of a broad "psychological warfare" front for the purpose of arousing enmity toward the Soviet nation and its Armed Forces. L. I. Brezhnev noted that "it is not surprising that our enemies, in an attempt to weaken the socialist community and its unity, are gambling on ideological subversions, which also are directed against armed forces of individual countries of socialism. . . . Imperialism now is making attacks on the authority of socialist armies and is trying to weaken their links with the people."¹

Acting as "a single chorus and a single orchestra," Sovietologists are attempting to distort the CPSU's military policy and discredit the Soviet Armed Forces. By fanning the myth of the Soviet military threat the servants

of imperialism thus are camouflaging the true goals of the unprecedented arms race and imposition of new means of mass destruction on allies, substantiating the search for a partnership with Beijing hegemonism, and striving to disrupt the world military balance and detente.

In accordance with demands of the 26th CPSU Congress on the need to wage a decisive struggle against anticomunism and against bourgeois and revisionist concepts of social development, and to rebuff the falsifiers of Marxism-Leninism,² this article exposes the most current modern techniques of bourgeois distortions of the essence of the military-theoretical heritage of the classics of Marxism-Leninism and Lenin's teaching on defense of the socialist homeland, and reveals the groundlessness and slanderous meaning of the versions used by bourgeois historiography as a substitute for the CPSU's actual organizing role in military organizational development.

Falsification of the CPSU's military policy is an inalienable element of the work of western sovietological establishments and organizations which is carefully coordinated on an international scale. While concealing their true goals, bourgeois authors distortedly interpret our party's managing role in military organizational development under the guise of "scientific character" and distort its history.³

The ill-intentioned direction of numerous western publications is revealed rather convincingly in a number of works by Soviet analysts.⁴

Exposure of the most refined techniques and methods by which the theoretical foundations of Soviet military organizational development are falsified is among the current tasks of criticism of contemporary bourgeois and revisionist ideology.

Attempts to discredit the military-theoretical heritage of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin hold an increasingly significant spot in the arsenal of means being used by imperialist propaganda in the interests of disrupting international detente. It is with special zeal that sovietologists strive to ascribe a certain "special militancy" and "cult of violence" to Marxism-Leninism. For example, Richard Pipes, one of the advisers to the assistant to the U.S. president for national security affairs, asserts: "Marxism represents a theory filled with a spirit of merciless conflict. . . . Violences and coercions act in it as regulators of human relationships."⁵ Elaboration of a thesis of the "leading role" of military goals in Marxism occupies a substantial place in the works of B. Wolfe, R. Tucker and (I.) Wallach. The conclusion of West German social democrat (W. Wette) is no less tendentious and completely wrong. It states that the class struggle allegedly is merely a variety of conventional war and the Marxist theory of the struggle of classes is a component part of the teaching on war.⁶

But the actual heritage of Marxism, and not the one prepared by bourgeois ideologists (especially the military-theoretical heritage) provides no grounds at all for absolutization of armed struggle. In describing methods of political struggle by the working class, Marx said: "Act . . . peacefully where this proves possible for us, and with weapons when it becomes necessary."⁷

A special love for military violence is inherent not to Marxist-Leninists, as the sovietologists would like to depict it, but to imperialism and the Maoists who are forming an alliance with them. Idolization of war and extolling it as a "vital factor" of international relations is one of the current subjects in works by bourgeois ideologists. For example, British military theorist M. Howard declares: "One has to state firmly that . . . military force is a necessary element in international affairs."⁸ It is on such a "theoretical" basis that imperialist policy is built. An example of this is the work of the present American administration.

With respect to the Beijing leadership, its official ideology--Maoism--declaims no less zealously for military violence, seeing it as a universal means for attaining its hegemonic, chauvinistic goals. Mao Zedong worded this extremely frankly, declaring: "Our leading number is war and dictatorship."

It is none other than the Maoists who idealize military violence and impose a cult of force. Materials of the last CCP congresses indicate that the resolution of any problems in China ultimately is linked with preparation for war, militarization of society and propagation of principles and methods of "barracks socialism."

It must be said that sovietological distortions of the military-theoretical heritage of classics of Marxism-Leninism have one characteristic feature. Bourgeois ideologists often attempt to split a leading revolutionary teaching into two allegedly mutually exclusive parts: Marxism and Leninism. But with regard to military issues, the falsifiers do not deny here the commonality of views of Marx, Engels and Lenin, with of course that very objective mentioned earlier: to depict the "cult of violence" as the essence of Marxism-Leninism.

The political purpose of speculation about a fictitious "cult of violence" is fully obvious. By artificially exaggerating military elements in the revolutionary teaching of Marx and Engels and proclaiming military theory the "foundation" of Marxism, sovietologists count on giving greater persuasiveness to age-old fabrications about the "aggressiveness" of socialism and its allegedly inherent course set on fanning wars. It stands to reason that these hysterics act as a sort of camouflage for imperialism's militaristic aspirations, reflect attempts to depict them merely as protective reaction to the "age-old" militancy of communist ideology and politics, and thus cover up the self-seeking interests of the military-industrial complex in the arms race, providing its pillars with gigantic profits.

Only the class bias of the apologists of imperialism permit "not noticing" that substantiation of the world-historic mission of the working class and the creative tasks of building socialism and communism, and not strictly the military issue, is the chief element in Marxism-Leninism. The military issue, being only part of the overall issue about the proletariat winning political power, is completely subordinated to tasks of the struggle for a dictatorship of the proletariat, and then to reliable defense of the socialist homeland. In conformity with this, the party's attention to military issues is determined by concrete historical conditions.

Bourgeois ideologists expend considerable effort to distort the theoretical foundations of Soviet military organizational development--Lenin's teaching on defense of the socialist homeland. Over the last 1½ decades dozens of works on Lenin have been published in the West, with the majority of them being characterized by a denial or crude distortion of Lenin's contribution to the development of military-theoretical thought. There are rather widespread statements that Lenin was not "an original military theorist" and that Soviet historians who speak of him as the founder of Soviet military science allegedly "commit a distortion of history."⁹

But these attempts are in vain. The authors of such conjectures crudely distort the facts in an attempt to ignore Lenin's outstanding contribution to military theory and his role as the founder of Soviet military science and a great proletarian military leader. The CPSU CC decree on the 110th anniversary of Lenin's birth notes: "Lenin's ideas on defense of the socialist homeland are of great importance. . . . A theorist of genius and the supreme strategist and tactician of the world proletariat, Lenin mastered to perfection the art of directing revolutionary struggle and the building of communism."¹⁰

The historical importance of Lenin's military-theoretical heritage and its role as an immutable foundation of CPSU military policy predetermine the motives for the sovietologists' negative attitude toward him as a whole and toward his fundamental theses. One of the fundamental provisions of Lenin's teaching--that of the objective need for a defense of socialist achievements--comes under especially fierce attack.

"Social democracy . . . never advanced military issues to the foreground until conditions of the civil war which had begun were apparent,"¹¹ states the Leninist proposition which serves as a reliable methodological basis for determining the place and role of military issues in party policy.

After the Great October victory the defense of socialist achievements repeatedly and insistently demanded that the party resolve the military issues first and foremost. And each time this was not at all the result of some special "predisposition" toward them, as bourgeois falsifiers endeavor to depict it. Thus, in analyzing the course of the Civil War, Lenin pointed out a phenomenon typical of this period such as the special position of a number of departments. He simultaneously directed attention to the exclusive, forced nature of this step, inasmuch as the country's salvation then depended wholly and fully on resolution of military issues.¹² This same circumstance also was noted by M. V. Frunze, in linking successes of military organizational development above all with the fact that "during the revolution the objective situation brought military tasks to the fore."¹³

The sum total of experience in the functioning of socialist states indicates that advancement of the military issue to the fore always was dictated exclusively by the need to rebuff encroachments of the external and internal counterrevolution. That was the case in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The martial law was instituted in Poland on a constitutional basis in December 1981 for these same reasons. L. I. Brezhnev noted that the supreme principle of building a new society is that "socialism can be established only if the power of the workers is able to defend the revolution

against all attacks of the class enemy (and such attacks are inevitable both from within and, more likely, from without)."¹⁴

But sovietologists zealously refute the forced nature of steps taken by the socialist state for armed defense. To this end facts indicating that the victorious revolution immediately encounters hostile military actions of the imperialist powers are hushed up or distorted.

An attempt is made by R. Garthoff, one of the leading American military ideologists, to revise the correctness of Lenin's conclusion about the inevitability of interventionist actions of capitalist states against the victorious proletariat. He states that "the Bolsheviks immediately snatched at the war against Germany (1917-1918) they inherited and the subsequent intervention of the allies and Poland into the Civil War in Russia (1918-1921) /as proof of the hostile intent of capitalism;/ since then this concept has become a Bolshevik dogma"¹⁵ (our emphasis--/Ye. S. and K. P./).

Garthoff is echoed by Professor F. Barghorn, of Yale University (United States), who considers the foreign military intervention against Soviet Russia to be "assistance" to communist ideology in the sense of receiving desirable arguments in order to "spread without great trouble the half-grounded opinion . . . that the bourgeois governments feverishly seek methods of inflicting maximum damage on the Soviet Union."¹⁶

Such assertions are absolutely absurd. The need for armed protection of socialist achievements never was a "dogma" or an abstract theoretical postulate for the USSR. From the first days of October the fate of the revolution depended wholly on effectiveness of steps to set up a military organization capable of protecting the socialist homeland reliably. Lenin stated at the 8th RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Congress: "We could not exist without armed protection of the socialist republic."¹⁷

The vital need for armed protection of the socialist state is determined by the aggressive nature of imperialism, which, Lenin stated, "is distinguished in its vital /economic/ attributes by the least love of peace and freedom and the greatest and comprehensive development of militarists."¹⁸ It was about this circumstance that Lenin deemed it necessary to constantly remind us in striving for maintenance of high vigilance toward intrigues of international imperialism. He called on us not to be flattered by the peaceloving assurances of the imperialist bourgeoisie and demanded that we "remember that the entire capitalist world is armed from head to toe and is awaiting the moment, choosing the best strategic conditions and investigating methods of attack."¹⁹

Lenin warned that the military danger "will not cease so long as world imperialism exists,"²⁰ and he viewed organizational development of the Armed Forces as a necessary element in overall Soviet organizational development, and a reliable condition for successful creation of a new society. Having substantiated the objective need for military protection of the socialist homeland, he demanded that the party give constant attention and take a "/serious/ attitude toward the country's defensive capability and combat training."²¹

The path covered by our country irrefutably attests that a fierce struggle of the forces of the old world against socialism is an immutable fact of the historical process, and protection of the achievements of the socialist revolution always have been the determining motive of the Soviet state's military efforts. "We bared our sword--and all our ill-wishers know this--only against those who made an attempt on the Soviet Motherland, its freedom and the nation's socialist achievements,"²² said Mar SU D. F. Ustinov at a ceremonial session dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the Armed Forces.

Allegiance to Lenin's teaching on defense of the socialist homeland and the imaginative development of its fundamental provisions determine the entire content of the CPSU's military policy and the objective of its efforts to perfect the material-technical base of the USSR's defensive capability, to improve the technical outfitting and organizational structure of the Armed Forces, and to raise the level of military cadres' training and the effectiveness of personnel training and indoctrination. Leninist ideas on defense of the socialist homeland, the essence of which lie in the dialectical unity of the Soviet Union's love of peace and its readiness to offer a resolute rebuff to any aggressor, were embodied in the CPSU Program and the Soviet Constitution. The CPSU Program states that strengthening of USSR defense and the might of the Soviet Armed Forces is a sacred cause of the party and all the Soviet nation and the supreme function of a socialist state.²³

The feeble impulses to depict the USSR as an aggressive state and the CPSU's military policy as expansionistic represent the alpha and omega of contemporary sovietology. That is the meaning of the statement by Canadian historian J. Swettenham: "World domination is the lodestar of Soviet Russia's politics and its constant goal."²⁴ The statement of American military writer P. Vigor is tendentious and false to the same extent: "Marxism-Leninism assumes the extension of the transition from capitalism to communism to the entire world . . . with the use of armed force."²⁵ The most venerable sovietologists such as R. Pipes, A. Ulam, W. Walsh, N. Riasanovsky and others enlarge²⁶ on the "program of world hegemony" allegedly being carried out by the USSR.

These "learned studies" ring in unison with the slanderous campaign unleashed by the present U.S. administration and the most aggressive circles of world imperialism to whom the myth of "Red hegemonism" is favorable.

Meanwhile it has long been known that our party and the communist and working parties of the world draw their confidence as to the coming triumph of communism on earth not at all in hopes of "aggression" or "terrorism" and not in the "export of revolution," which is resolutely denied and condemned by Marxist-Leninists, but in the objective course of social progress, in the historical doom of capitalism, in a growth in the consciousness and organization of the working class, and in broad development of revolutionary and national liberation movements.

The curious nature of the interpretation by L. Goure, director of the University of Miami Research Center (United States), of the essence of military-patriotic indoctrination in the Soviet Union as development of an individual ready to give his life for "expanding the communist system"²⁷ draws attention to itself.

It must be remembered that the renegade K. Kautskiy, who stated that the Red Army had aggressive goals for violent spread of communism and only a "lack of roads" hindered it from "winning Europe"²⁸ was at the origin of the slanderous campaign to discredit the CPSU's military policy and the myth of the so-called "Soviet military threat," "export of revolution," "Red militarism" and "communist expansion."

Let us recall how Lenin, stigmatizing various "Marx-eaters" for slanderous techniques of the struggle against socialism, wrote: "It is true that you don't even believe your eyes when you read such things. The contemporary professorial science has come down to such a degree of decay, decadence and prostitution!"²⁹ It would appear that this also can be extended with full substantiation to the opuses of contemporary bourgeois pseudoscientists reproduced above.

The sovietologists' exaggeration of versions of the USSR's "aggressiveness" prompts them to seek any kind of "substantiations" at all. The reader is persuaded that the danger allegedly is caused by communist ideology and aggravated by the effects of a number of other factors such as, in particular, the Soviet Union's geographic position or the "identity" of the foreign policy of the USSR and czarist Russia, and so on. Ya. Nanuashvili, one of the spokesmen for these views, attempts to propagate the following myth: "Soviet politics is a continuation of 400 years of Russian history . . . of expansion and conquest."³⁰

It is easy to discern in the hidden basis of these assertions the bourgeoisie's social order, which prompts one to close his eyes intentionally to the fundamental, basic differences of the social-economic system and military-political goals of czarist Russia and the Soviet Union. (There is also no doubt as to the ill-meaning nature of the indiscriminate description of Russian history as exclusively predatory--but this is the subject of a special discussion.)

"Substantiations" as to the USSR's "aggressiveness" because of its geographic position, based on extremely reactionary geopolitical teachings, are speculative to the same extent. Sovietologists advance the far-fetched formula: "The more neighbors there are, the more enemies there are." American professor (D.) Wesley even arrived at a discovery of a unique "principle": "The frequency of wars among neighboring countries is higher than the frequency of wars among countries geographically remote from each other."³¹

But how can it be explained, based on this profound conclusion, why the United States, which borders only with two states on land, repeatedly carried out armed aggression in postwar years against countries with which it has no common border? How can this be correlated with the USSR, which throughout its history used the Armed Forces only as a tool for protecting its sovereignty and the sovereignty of countries with which it is linked by appropriate treaty obligations?

There can be only one answer: Aggressiveness of a state is determined not by geographic position, but by the politics of the ruling exploiting classes and their interest in war as a tool of expansion. Destructive wars, a build-up of

the arms race and the threat of thermonuclear catastrophe--all this is inherently an attribute of imperialism and is its calling card.

The bourgeois interpretation of the content and direction of the USSR's defense measures is subordinated to searches for the USSR's "aggressiveness." As a rule, this interpretation does not go beyond the bounds of assertions that the Soviet Union's military potential exceeds the limits of defense and indicates "the unchanged nature of Moscow's desire to take the Red flag to the most remote parts of the world."³² The tendentious estimate of the USSR's military expenditures is accompanied each time by statements that they "surpass or are equal" to U.S. military expenditures.³³ References, almanacs and encyclopedias frighten the man in the street with incredible reports about the armament and size of Soviet troops. As a rule, they are accompanied each time by obscure hints at certain "intelligence" sources, which precludes the possibility of a check.

In this regard it is impossible not to recall the words of L. I. Brezhnev: "The entire world knows that our might needs no advertising or verbose proofs. Boasting is alien to us and we do not wish to threaten anyone, but it must be noted that figures and estimates being quoted in the West with respect to the Soviet Union's nuclear missile power hardly attest to the extent to which their compilers are informed, and particularly the intelligence agencies of imperialist states."³⁴

Attempts are made simultaneously to depict the USSR's defense measures as incompatible with peace initiatives and to find the Soviet side's "insincerity." K. (Gasteyger), for example, frightens us with "Soviet politics is thoroughly contaminated with the fixed idea that the USSR always is encircled by a hostile world. . . . Its ideological basis is that communism absolutely cannot reckon with the existence of any other political system in the world."³⁵

Responding to questions from editors of the journal SPIEGEL, Comrade Brezhnev said: "It is asserted in some capitals of NATO countries that the Soviet Union is at fault for the fact that stormclouds have gathered over the world. But if we dismiss the propaganda chimeras and turn to the facts, it will become clear that this is an ill-intentioned fabrication. The Soviet Union threatens no one, nor does it plan to attack anyone. And our military doctrine bears a defensive character."³⁶ These words contain a convincing answer to the falsifiers.

International imperialism headed by the most reactionary forces of the United States is the true carrier of aggressiveness and of the real threat to peace. The United States has stationed the main portion of nuclear-powered submarines, aircraft carriers and strategic aviation and considerable contingents of ground forces, Marines and air defense weapons far beyond its national borders.

At the present time the United States has over 1,500 military bases and installations on the territory of 32 states, where over a half-million American servicemen are constantly stationed. According to data of the American Brookings Institution, during the period 1946-1975 the United States resorted

directly or indirectly to the use of armed forces or threatened other countries with military intervention 215 times. It was the initiator or participant in a majority of military conflicts since 1945, in which over ten million persons died.³⁷

At the borderline of the 1970's and 1980's the international situation became sharply aggravated. Militant circles of the United States and NATO began a massive campaign to disrupt detente. They are attempting to impose a state of siege on countries of socialism and throw forces of national and social liberation backward. Steps by the U.S. administration to force ahead new arms programs (full-scale production of the neutron weapon, the MX ballistic missiles and the XM-1 tanks), an expansion of military bases around the USSR and creation of a special troop contingent for interventionist purposes--the 200,000-man "rapid deployment force"--reflected an attempt to disrupt detente. The Pentagon simultaneously is fostering plans to create a fleet of tactical satellites with laser weapons in space orbits.

A unique answer followed the USSR's Berlin initiative on unilateral reduction of Soviet troops in Central Europe: NATO adopted a resolution on stationing 600 American medium-range nuclear missile launchers in Western Europe. L. I. Brezhnev remarked that "it can be seen clearly that leading circles of the United States and certain other NATO countries have set a course hostile to the cause of detente, a course toward an acceleration of the arms race leading to increased military danger."³⁸

This is why, in struggling to preserve peace and prevent a new war, our party and its Central Committee constantly keep a focus on questions of military organizational development and strengthening of the Armed Forces. Concern for a comprehensive increase in the Motherland's defensive might and for indoctrinating Soviet citizens in a spirit of high vigilance and constant readiness to defend the great achievements of socialism has been and remains one of the most important tasks of the CPSU. Exposure of the myth of the "Soviet military threat" holds a most important place in this work. This myth is the primary drug of antisovietism and a leading element for the western propaganda machine to substantiate the need for increasing military expenditures, developing new models of deadly weapons and justifying NATO's military activeness. Directing attention to the wide range of manipulations with this anticommunist lie, the 25th CPSU Congress resolutely rejected fabrications about the imaginary threat, declaring: "As a matter of fact, no Soviet threat exists either for the West or for the East. All this is a monstrous lie from beginning to end. The Soviet Union is not planning to attack anyone."³⁹

The West has no objective grounds for fears concerning the "Soviet military threat," nor can there be any, and in reality this is not what frightens international imperialism. Fear of another sort is carefully concealed behind this artificial "threat": the fear by the imperialist bourgeoisie of a strengthening of the positions of world socialism, the rise and successes of the liberating struggle of nations, and of a build-up in the overall crisis of capitalism. It is a class fear by the bourgeoisie of social changes, which it carefully conceals from the masses of people, using the notorious "military threat" of the Soviet Union to the West as camouflage.

The false myth of the "Soviet military threat," actively cultivated by the bourgeoisie, is a multipurpose weapon and performs very definite social functions.

First of all it is used as a means of discrediting the peaceloving foreign policy, slandering the historical purpose of the Soviet Armed Forces and compromising real socialism as a whole. World reaction links with it hopes for isolation of communists from other peaceloving forces and defamation of everyone who speaks out against adventurism in international affairs and who struggles for freedom and national independence.

Secondly, it plays the role of ideological "substantiation" by imperialist circles of the arms race, the acceleration of military preparations, and efforts to achieve military superiority over countries of socialism.

Thirdly, speculations on this myth permit the military-industrial complex to obtain superprofits and conduct an offensive against workers' rights.

Fourthly, this is a very important means of anticomunist propaganda and of shaping a militaristically oriented mass consciousness.

The Soviet state's peaceloving foreign policy course and the immutability of Leninist principles of foreign policy are generally known. They are fixed in the CPSU Program, which states: "While capitalism has spread its domination by fire and sword, socialism needs no wars for spreading its ideals. Superiority over the old system in organizing society, in the state system, in economics, and in elevating the standard of living and spiritual culture--these are its weapons."⁴⁰

The Soviet Union never has been an adherent of politics from a position of strength. L. I. Brezhnev said in a speech dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the GDR's formation: "Our intentions never have included, nor do they include, a threat to any state or group of states whatsoever. Our strategic doctrine has a strictly defensive direction."⁴¹

Hence it is no contradiction that again and again, in proposing concrete steps in the area of disarmament, the USSR and countries of the socialist community simultaneously show concern for their defensive might. Under conditions where the United States and aggressive circles of the West's imperialist powers proceeding in its wake do not wish to solve the problem of disarmament on an equal basis and accelerate the arms race, concern for strengthening defenses cannot help but remain a very important function for the state of developed socialism.

Party management of the Armed Forces is the be-all and end-all of Soviet military organizational development.⁴² This is objectively determined by the special role of the CPSU, which is the guiding and directing force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system. One of the most important constitutional provisions states: "Armed by Marxist-Leninist teaching, the Communist Party determines the general perspective for society's development

and the line of the USSR's domestic and foreign policy; manages the great creative endeavor of the Soviet nation; and gives its struggle for the victory of communism a planned, scientifically grounded character."⁴³

The party's organizing role in the area of Soviet military organizational development is many-sided. It is on the basis of party resolutions that the structure and organization of the Armed Forces are perfected under CPSU direction, the Army and Navy's outfitting is improved with up-to-date weapons and combat equipment, preparation of military cadres and the training and indoctrination of personnel is carried on--in short, there is no sphere in Soviet military organizational development where the beneficial effect of the party's political and organizational measures do not manifest themselves.

In directing the reinforcement of national defenses and improvement of the Armed Forces, the CPSU elaborates a program of military organizational development and determines the Army and Navy's missions. It has a decisive role to play in elaborating fundamental directions in the fields of military science, military doctrine and strategy and in the shaping and successful implementation of military policy, which cause special irritation in the enemies of socialism and bourgeois ideologists. This explains the continuous attacks they make on the CPSU's direction of the Armed Forces and on the work of political entities, the party-political apparatus, and party and Komsomol organizations.

In critically analyzing the works of bourgeois "specialists" devoted to the Soviet Armed Forces, we see that the majority of them intentionally sidestep the term "party leadership." It is deliberately replaced by an openly negative concept--"party control over the Army."

This approach to the problem of the CPSU's managing work in the Armed Forces prevails in works by L. Shapiro, R. Garthoff, E. Pruck, M. McIntosh, J. Erickson, H. Goldhammer, W. Leonard, E. (Zobik) and a number of other bourgeois historians, sociologists and military writers. "Party control over the Army," "the system of political control over the Army," and "strict political control"--this rhetoric roves from work to work, from page to page.⁴⁴

Party control over bourgeois military specialists which occurred during the Civil War serves as the formal basis for this interpretation, but it is intentionally absolutized and the control functions of military commissars with respect to former Czarist Army officers and generals are arbitrarily transferred to the entire field of party and Army relationships. One of the principles of party leadership--the principle of control over and organization of the execution of party decisions--is prepared for the very same purposes. The second part is discarded and the first is hypertrophied. While intentionally disrupting the dialectical unity of two interrelated aspects of the party's managing work, the falsifiers deprive party leadership of its true content and substitute for this bare control which thus is transformed from a means into the end of party work in the Armed Forces.

The further we go the more there is. A certain party "fear" of the Army and even "fear of a military plot" are fabricated for substantiating the invented "control."⁴⁵ Sovietologists are not stingy with inventions about "conflicts"

and "contradictions" between the party and Army, inventing them "vertically" and "horizontally."⁴⁶

There is also no lack of forecasts as to how a "conflict" might end. For example, Professor J. Armstrong of the University of Wisconsin (United States) believes that "contradictions" between the party and Army will lead to a military dictatorship and will provide an opportunity to "reject Leninism."⁴⁷ A hungry chicken dreams of millet!

All this philosophizing by bourgeois ideologists about phases and cycles of "military-party relationships" and about their "tension" and "contradictory nature," which have nothing in common with reality, are the product of a sick imagination and reflect the desired-for dream of those who would like to see the Soviet Armed Forces weakened, military-political leadership disturbed, and command and political cadres torn apart by contradictions.

These hopes are vain. The strength of Soviet military-political leadership lies in the Communist Party's organizing and directing role. It is ensured by the entire system of socialist social relationships and by the Soviet state system. The Communist Party's coordination of actions of the party, state and military apparatus always permitted a more purposeful and efficient concentration of national efforts in the interests of strengthening defensive capabilities and increasing the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The CPSU's managing role in military organizational development is embodied in the work of the collective of many thousands of Army and Navy party members and the broad network of political entities and party organizations which are the active conductors of party policy in the Armed Forces.

Political entities--the CPSU's managing entities in the Army and Navy--are an inalienable part of the Armed Forces organizational structure. Their role, tasks and work forms are determined by the special Statute approved by the Central Committee. Together with party organizations and in close unity with commanders, the political entities persistently strive to implement party instructions about a comprehensive increase in the Armed Forces combat might, ensure daily and effective party influence on the entire life and work of the Army and Navy, act as the indoctrinators of personnel, and serve as a reliable support for commanders in strengthening their combat readiness.

Pointing out the need for and explaining the purpose of active party-political work among the troops, the party Central Committee noted back in the period when the new Army was being formed: "In order for the Red Army to be really socialist, . . . there must be party work in its midst."⁴⁸

"Where political work is performed most solicitously in the troops," emphasized V. I. Lenin in 1919, ". . . there is no slackness in the Army, its order and its spirit are better and there are more victories."⁴⁹

Evaluating the role of party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces, L. I. Brezhnev remarked: "The strength of this weapon has been tested in the flame of battle. Even now it frightens our enemies."⁵⁰

The party devotes much attention to improving party-political work. This was reflected vividly in the CPSU Program, congress resolutions and resolutions of CPSU CC plenums. The October 1957 CPSU CC Plenum was a significant milestone in development of the Armed Forces and in the reinforcement of political entities and party organizations of the Army and Navy. The Plenum considered an increase in the level of party-political work to be a most important condition for reinforcing party leadership of the Armed Forces. The CPSU CC decree dated 21 January 1967 entitled "On Measures for Improving Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy" is permeated with concern for a further strengthening of the effectiveness of party leadership in all spheres of Army and Navy life. It emphasized that a comprehensive improvement of party-political work is a most important condition for successful accomplishment of missions facing the Armed Forces. These resolutions had a most beneficial effect on the work of political entities and party organizations and helped elevate it to the level of modern demands.

The reactionary bourgeois historiography attempts to give a quite different, false interpretation of party-political work. The label of "nonsense" is hung on it. It is interpreted as a measure of a "forced" character and the activity of political workers and party organizations of the Army and Navy is depicted as "interference" in commanders' affairs which allegedly causes constant "friction" among commanders and political workers.⁵¹

J. Erickson, M. McIntosh, H. Goldhammer, E. Pruck and a number of other sovietologists attempt to assure the readers that party-political work allegedly does harm to the fighting qualities of Soviet Armed Forces personnel and hinders their professional training. "The activeness of political workers and political entities," declares West German military writer E. Pruck, "harms troop spirit and homogeneity of the officer corps."⁵²

Bourgeois falsifiers try to see in this even a certain "weakness" of the Soviet military organization and thus try to blacken the essence and results of party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces. This is no accident, since the entire history of the Soviet Armed Forces proves that effective party-political work among the troops in peacetime is the primary component of high troop combat readiness, and in wartime is a most important factor of victory. "And when we consider that the fighting spirit of the troops always was recognized as a most important factor of troop steadfastness," remarked L. I. Brezhnev in the book "Malaya Zemlya" [The Novorossiysk Base of Operations], "then it was the political worker who was entrusted with the keenest weapon in the war years. He tempered the soldiers' hearts and souls, without which the tanks, guns or aircraft would not have brought us victory."⁵³

This and this alone explains the various kinds of malignancies of bourgeois apologists concerning party-political work and its active conductors among the troops.

The commonality of interests and actions of the commander and political officer is determined not by the notorious "fears for one's career,"⁵⁴ as western falsifiers try to depict it, but by a high sense of duty to the Motherland and common ideas of doing everything possible for her security.

The party and Army are in full unity and command and political cadres work cohesively and in concert. L. I. Brezhnev remarked that "in being among the military, it is pleasant to hear and feel how the efforts and work of commanders and political officers have merged as one. . . . And how gratifying it is to see that there exists a firm military and party friendship in the midst of our military cadres, where commanders and political officers act as one, the political officer helps the commander and the commander values and relies on the political officer. Our great strength and the strength and firmness of our Army lie in this unity and friendship."⁵⁵

Genuine reality confirmed exhaustively the truth and depth of program provisions about the increase in the CPSU's managing role in all walks of life of our society and about the objective conditionality of this process. This principle also acts fully in the area of Soviet military organizational development. In accordance with resolutions of congresses and the Central Committee, party leadership of the Armed Forces is becoming more and more effective. The material-technical base of national defense is being perfected, the organizational structure of the Soviet Armed Forces and training of military cadres is improving, and the level of personnel training and indoctrination is rising. Behind all this stands the wisdom and will of the tested leader of the Soviet people, the Communist Party.

A critical analysis of works by sovietologists persuades one of the class-oriented, patented spite of the bourgeoisie toward the Soviet state's military organization and of the programmed nature of slanderous fabrications about the CPSU's leading role in military organizational development. An intensification in the scope and the special refinement of efforts by bourgeois falsifiers of the CPSU's military policy are predetermined both by their direct obligation to substantiate the need for an arms race extremely profitable for the military-industrial complex, and by needs of the imperialist bourgeoisie for an ideological substantiation of the aggressive, anticomunist course of its governments, motives of shaping at any cost a militaristically oriented awareness of the population of capitalist countries, and hopes of achieving subversion of the spiritual potential of the Soviet Union's might.

Socialism is in a historic offensive. Its forces are constantly growing stronger. Our Motherland's military might is indestructible. Mankind's faith in the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism is growing constantly. But even today Lenin's warning is extremely current: "The most dangerous is to underestimate the enemy and rest content in the fact that we are stronger."⁵⁶

FOOTNOTES

1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskimi kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [With a Leninist Course: Speeches and Articles], Vol 2, Moscow, 1970, p 256.
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3. See for example R. Garthoff, "The Soviet Military Policy. A Historical Analysis," New York, 1966; R. Kolkowicz, "The Soviet Military and the Communist Party," New York, 1967; L. Schapiro, "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union," 2d ed., London, 1970; "The Soviet War Machine. An Encyclopedia of Russian Military Equipment and Strategy," London, 1976; J. Erickson, "Soviet Military Power," London 1971; L. Goure, "The Military Indoctrination of the Soviet Union," New York, 1973; H. Goldhammer, "The Soviet Soldier. Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level," New York, 1975; "Soviet Naval Policy. Objectives and Constraints," edited by M. McGwire, New York, 1975; B. Palmer, ed., "Grand Strategy for the 1980's," Washington, 1978; "Understanding Soviet Naval Developments," 3d ed., Washington, 1978; P. Gostony, "Die Rote Armee. Geschichte und Aufbau der Sowjetischen Streitkraeften seit 1917" [The Red Army: History and Organizational Development of the Soviet Armed Forces Since 1917], Wien, 1980.
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6. For more detail on this see VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, No 7, 1979, pp 81-92.
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8. M. Howard, "Studies in War and Peace," New York, 1971, p 154.
9. "Lenin. The Man, the Theorist, the Leader. A Reappraisal," London, 1967, p 182; "Studies on the Soviet Union," Vol X, No 1, Munich, pp 20-35, etc.
10. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK" [The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and CC Plenums], Vol 13, Moscow, 1981, p 532.
11. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], X, 340.
12. See Lenin, XLI, 292.
13. M. V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Moscow, 1965, p 225.

14. Brezhnev, Vol 6, Moscow, 1978, p 588.
15. Garthoff, p 67.
16. F. Barghorn, "Soviet Foreign Propaganda," Princeton, 1964, p 38.
17. Lenin, XXXVIII, 138.
18. Ibid., XXXVII, 248.
19. Ibid., XL, 284.
20. Ibid., XLII, 173.
21. Ibid., XXXV, 395.
22. D. F. Ustinov, "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1979, p 36.
23. See "Programma Kommunisticheskoye partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [CPSU Program], Moscow, 1976, pp 110-111.
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25. "The Soviet War Machine. An Encyclopedia of Russian Military Equipment and Strategy," p 12.
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27. Goure, p 2.
28. See K. Kautskiy, "Terrorizm i kommunizm" [Terrorism and Communism], Berlin, 1919, p 203.
29. Lenin, XXV, 51.
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35. MILITARY REVIEW, Vol LIVIII [sic], No 2, February 1978, p 38.
36. KOMMUNIST, No 17, 1981, p 17.
37. See "Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru" [From Whence the Threat to Peace Comes], Moscow, 1982, pp 28, 76.
38. Brezhnev, "Leninskym kursom. Rechi, privetstviya, stat'i" [With a Leninist Course: Speeches, Greetings, Articles], Vol 8, Moscow, 1981, pp 244-245.
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41. Brezhnev, "Leninskym kursom. Rechi, privetstviya, stat'i," p 145.
42. See "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza," p 112.
43. "Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik" [USSR Constitution (Basic Law)], Moscow, 1977, p 8.
44. See L. Schapiro, p 499; OSTEUROPA, December 1964, p 893; Goldhammer, p 178; Garthoff, p 61.
45. "The Soviet War Machine," p 22; J. Baylis, K. Booth, J. Garnett and P. Williams, "Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies," New York, 1975; J. Armstrong, "The Politics of Totalitarianism. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1934 to the Present," New York, 1961, p 341; J. Armstrong, "Ideology, Politics and Government in the Soviet Union," 3d ed., London, 1974, p 110.
46. See Kolkowicz, SURVEY, London, No 65, October 1967, p 777.
47. Armstrong, "Ideology, Politics and Government in the Soviet Union," p 113.
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54. "Understanding Soviet Naval Developments," p 48.
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56. Lenin, XLI, 144.

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